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What form of intellectual property rights (IPR) policy contributes to economic growth? Should technological
followers be able to license the products of technological leaders? Should a company with a large
technological lead receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited lead? We develop
a general equilibrium framework to investigate these questions. The economy consists of many industries
and firms engaged in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. IPR policy regulates whether followers
in an industry can copy the technology of the leader and also how much they have to pay to license
past innovations. With full patent protection, followers can catch up to the leader in their industry
either by making the same innovation(s) themselves or by making some pre-specified payments to
the technological leaders. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize some
of its properties. We then quantitatively investigate the implications of different types of IPR policy
on the equilibrium growth rate. The two major results of this exercise are as follows. First, the growth
rate in the standard models used in the (growth) literature can be improved significantly by introducing
a simple form of licensing. Second, we show that full patent protection is not optimal from the viewpoint
of maximizing the growth rate of the economy and that the growth-maximizing policy involves state-dependent
IPR protection, providing greater protection to technological leaders that are further ahead than those
that are close to their followers. This form of the growth-maximizing policy is a result of the "trickle-down"
effect, which implies that providing greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their followers
than a certain threshold increases the R&D incentives also for all technological leaders that are less
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How should the intellectual property rights of a company be protected? Should a ﬁrm with
a large technological lead receive the same intellectual property rights (IPR) protection as a
company with a more limited technological lead? These questions are central to many discus-
sions of patent policy. A recent ruling of the European Commission, for example, has required
Microsoft to share secret information about its products with other software companies (New
York Times, December 22, 2004). There is a similar debate about whether Apple should make
iPod’s code available to competitors that are producing complementary products. Central to
the debate about Microsoft and iPod is the fact that they have a substantial technological
lead over their rivals. This implies that the analysis of many of the relevant policy and acad-
emic questions requires a framework for the analysis of state-dependent patent/IPR protection
policy. By state-dependent IPR policy, we mean a policy that makes the extent of patent
or intellectual property rights protection conditional on the technology gap between diﬀerent
ﬁrms in the industry. Existing work has investigated the optimal length and breadth of patents
assuming an IPR policy that does not allow for licensing and is uniform. In this paper, we make
a ﬁrst attempt to develop a framework that incorporates both licensing of existing patents and
state-dependent IPR policies.
Our basic framework builds on and extends the step-by-step innovation models of Aghion,
Harris and Vickers (1997) and Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), where a number of
(typically two) ﬁrms engage in price competition within an industry and undertake R&D in
order to improve the quality of their product. The technology gap between the ﬁrms determines
the extent of the monopoly power of the leader, and hence the price markups and proﬁts.
The purpose of R&D by the follower is to catch up and surpass the leader (as in standard
Schumpeterian models of innovation, e.g., Reinganum, 1981, 1985, Aghion and Howitt, 1992,
Grossman and Helpman, 1991), while the purpose of R&D by the leader is to escape the
competition of the follower and increase its markup and proﬁts. As in racing-type models in
general (e.g., Harris and Vickers, 1985, 1987, Budd, Harris and Vickers, 1993), a large gap
between the leader and the follower discourages R&D by both. Consequently, overall R&D
and technological progress are greater when the technology gap between the leader and the
follower is relatively small.1 One may expect that full patent protection may be suboptimal in
a world of step-by-step competition; by stochastically or deterministically allowing the follower
1Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt (2005) provide empirical evidence that there is greater R&D
in British industries where there is a smaller technological gap between ﬁrms. See O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and
Thisse (1998) for a discussion of how patent life may come to an end because of related innovations.
1to use the innovations of the technological leader, the likelihood of relatively small gap between
leaders and followers, and thus the amount of R&D may be raised.2 Based on this intuition, one
may further conjecture that state-dependent IPR policy may also be useful and should provide
less protection to ﬁrms that are technologically more advanced relative to their competitors.
There are two problems with this intuition. First, existing growth models (including those
mentioned above) do not allow licensing of the leading-edge technology and the presence of
licensing changes the trade-oﬀs underlying the above intuition.3 Second, the above intuition is
derived from models with uniform IPR policy, without a systematic study of the implications
of state-dependent IPR policy on R&D incentives.
To investigate these issues systematically, we construct a general equilibrium model with
step-by-step innovation, potential licensing of patents and state-dependent IPR policy. In our
model economy, each ﬁrm can climb the technology ladder via three diﬀerent methods: (i)
by “catch-up R&D,” that is, R&D investments applied to a variant of the technology of the
leader; (ii) by “frontier R&D,” that is, building on the patented innovations of the technological
leader for a pre-speciﬁed license fee; and (iii) as a result of the expiration of the patent of the
technological leader. The second feature is not present in any growth model that we are aware
of, but is essential for understanding how IPR policy works in practice.
The combination of these policies allows a variety of diﬀerent policy regimes. The ﬁrst is full
patent protection with no licensing, which corresponds to the environment assumed in existing
growth models (e.g., Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers, 2001) and provides full (indeﬁnite)
patent protection to technological leaders, but does not allow any licensing agreements (it sets
the license fees to inﬁnity). The second is full patent protection with licensing,w h i c ha l l o w s
technological followers to build on the leading-edge technology in return for a license fee. We
refer to this regime as “full patent protection” because patents never expire and followers have
to pay a patent fee equal to the gain in net present value resulting from the use of the leading-
edge technology.4 The third regime is uniform imperfect patent protection, which deviates
from the previous two benchmarks by allowing either expiration of patents and/or license
fees that are less than the full beneﬁt to the follower. The adjective uniform indicates that
2This is conjectured, for example, in Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001).
3See Scotchmer (2005) for the importance of incorporating these types of licensing agreements into models
of innovation.
4T h ea l t e r n a t i v ew o u l db ef o rt h ef o l l o w e r st op a yaf e e equal to the damage to the technological leader,
resulting from the loss of the leader’s monopoly power after their licensing and further innovation. In practice,
licensing fees or patent infringement fees reﬂect both the beneﬁts to the ﬁrm using the knowledge and the
damage to the original inventor (see, e.g., Scotchmer, 2005). In our analysis, we allow the license fees to be set
at any level, thus incorporating both possibilities.
2in this policy environment all industries are treated identically irrespective of the technology
gap between the leader and the follower. The ﬁnal and most interesting policy regime is
state-dependent imperfect patent protection, which deviates from full patent protection as a
function of the technology gap between the leader and the follower in the industry (i.e., it
allows technologically more advanced ﬁrms to receive more or less protection). Each of these
policy regimes captures a diﬀerent conceptualization of IPR policy and is interesting in its own
right. Note however that the last regime is general enough to nest the other three.
We ﬁrst prove the existence of a stationary (steady-state) equilibrium under any of these
policy regimes and characterize a number of features of the equilibrium analytically. For
example, we prove that with uniform IPR policy, R&D investments decline when the gap
between the leader and the follower increases.
We then turn to a quantitative investigation of growth-maximizing (“optimal”) IPR policy,
by providing a number of simulations of the equilibrium for plausible parameter values and for
diﬀerent forms of IPR policies.5 Our quantitative investigation leads to two major results:
1. Allowing for licensing of patents increases the equilibrium growth rate of the economy
signiﬁcantly. Intuitively, without such licensing, a large part of the R&D eﬀort goes to
duplication, and followers’ R&D does not contribute to the growth rate of the economy.
Licensing implies that R&D by all ﬁrms–not just the leaders–contributes to growth
and also increases the R&D incentives of followers. In our benchmark parameterization,
allowing for licensing increases the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of the economy
from 1.86% to 2.58% per annum.
2. Growth-maximizing IPR policy is state dependent. In particular, because of the disin-
centive eﬀect of relaxing IPR protection on R&D, uniform IPR policy (either by ma-
nipulating license fees or the duration of patents) has minimal eﬀect on the equilibrium
growth rate. In contrast, state-dependent IPR policy can signiﬁcantly increase innova-
tion and growth in the economy. For example, in our baseline parameterization, optimal
state-dependent IPR policy increases the growth rate to 2.96% relative to the growth
rate of 2.63% under uniform IPR policy. More important than the quantitative eﬀect
of growth-maximizing state-dependent IPR policy is its form. We ﬁnd in all cases that
5Throughout, we simplify terminology by using the terms “optimal” and “growth-maximizing” interchange-
ably. It is well known that welfare-maximizing and growth-maximizing policies need not coincide, and in fact,
in models with quality competition, the equilibrium may involve excessive innovation and growth (e.g., Aghion
and Howitt, 1992). Nevertheless, when the discount rate is small, welfare and growth-maximizing policies will
be close, which justiﬁes our use of the term “optimal” in this context.
3optimal state-dependent IPR policy provides greater protection to technological leaders
that are further ahead than those that have only a small lead relative to their followers.
The reason for this result is the trickle-down of R&D incentives. In particular, when a
particular state for the leader (say being n∗ steps ahead of the follower) is very proﬁtable,
this increases the incentives to perform R&D not only for leaders that are n∗ − 1 steps
ahead, but for all leaders with a lead of size n ≤ n∗ −1. Notably, the trickle-down eﬀect
can be powerful enough to increase–rather than reduce–the R&D investments by tech-
nological leaders relative to the benchmark with full patent protection. Thus, reducing
the IPR protection of leaders that are few steps ahead while oﬀering a high degree of
protection to ﬁrms that are suﬃciently advanced relative to their competitors increases
R&D incentives. Consequently, in contrast to existing models, imperfect state-dependent
IPR can increase R&D investments relative to full protection. Moreover, contrary to the
conjecture above, the trickle-down eﬀect implies that the optimal state-dependent IPR
policy should provide greater protection to ﬁrms that have a larger technological lead.
Overall, our analysis illustrates the diﬀerent eﬀects of IPR policy on the equilibrium growth
rate of an economy. It shows that allowing for licensing can increase growth signiﬁcantly and
that optimal state-dependent IPR policy can also increase the growth rate of an economy
relative to uniform IPR policy. Consequently, the beneﬁts of considering a rich set of IPR
policies could be substantial in practice. Our analysis also suggests that the structure of optimal
IPR may depend on the equilibrium industry structure (which determines the technology gap
between leaders and followers as a function of the underlying technology of the industry). A
more detailed analysis of the relationship between industry structure and the optimal form of
IPR policy is an area for future research.
Our paper is a contribution both to the IPR protection and the endogenous growth liter-
atures. The industrial organization and growth literatures emphasize that ex-post monopoly
rents and thus patents are central to generate the ex-ante investments in R&D and technological
progress, even though monopoly power also creates distortions (e.g., Arrow, 1962, Reinganum,
1981, Tirole, 1988, Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1992,
Green and Scotchmer, 1995, Scotchmer, 1999, Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002, O’Donoghue and
Zweimuller, 2004).6
Much of the literature discusses the trade-oﬀ between these two forces to determine the
optimal length and breadth of patents. For example, Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and Shapiro
6Boldrin and Levine (2001, 2004) or Quah (2003) argue that patent systems are not necessary for innovation.
4(1990) show that optimal patents should have a long duration in order to provide inducement to
R&D, but a narrow breadth so as to limit monopoly distortions. A number of other papers, for
example, Gallini (1992) and Gallini and Scotchmer (2002), reach opposite conclusions. Another
branch of the literature, including the seminal paper by Scotchmer (1999) and the recent
interesting papers by Llobet, Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001) and Hopenhayn and Mitchell
(2001), adopts a mechanism design approach to the determination of the optimal patent and
intellectual property rights protection system. For example, Scotchmer (1999) derives the
patent renewal system as an optimal mechanism in an environment where the cost and value
of diﬀerent projects are unobserved and the main problem is to decide which projects should
go ahead. To the best of our knowledge, no other paper in the literature has considered state-
dependent patent or IPR policy, which is the focus of the current paper. As a ﬁrst attempt, we
only look at state-dependent patent length and license fees (though similar ideas can be applied
to an investigation of the gains from making the breadth of patent awards state-dependent).
Our paper is most closely related to and extends the results of Aghion, Harris and Vickers
(1997) and Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001) on endogenous growth with step-by step
innovation.7 Although our model builds on these papers, it also diﬀe r sf r o mt h e mi nan u m b e r
of signiﬁcant ways. First, we allow licensing agreements whereby followers can pay a pre-
speciﬁed license fee for building on the leading-edge technology developed by other ﬁrms. We
show that such licensing has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the equilibrium growth rate of the economy.
Second, our economy incorporates a general IPR policy that can be state dependent. Third,
in our economy there is a general equilibrium interaction between production and R&D, since
they both compete for scarce labor.8 Finally, we provide a number of analytical results for the
general model (with or without IPR policy), while Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001)
focus on the case where innovations are either “drastic” (so that the leader never undertakes
R&D) or very small. They also do not prove the existence of a steady state or characterize the
properties of the equilibrium in this class of economies.
Finally, our results are also related to the literature on tournaments and races, for example,
Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole (1983), Harris and Vickers (1985, 1987), Choi (1991),
Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993), Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), Baye and Hoppe
7Segal and Whinston (2005) analyze the impact of anti- t r u s tp o l i c yo ne c o n o m i cg r o w t hi nar e l a t e dm o d e l
of step-by-step innovation.
8This general equilibrium aspect is introduced to be able to close the model economy without unrealistic
assumptions and makes our economy more comparable to other growth models (Aghion, Harris, Howit and
Vickers, 2001, assume a perfectly elastic supply of labor). We show that the presence of general equilibrium
interactions does not signiﬁcantly complicate the analysis and it is still possible to characterize the steady-state
equilibrium.
5(2003), and Moscarini and Squintani (2004). This literature considers the impact of endogenous
or exogenous prizes on eﬀort in tournaments, races or R&D contests. In terms of this literature,
state-dependent IPR policy can be thought of as state-dependent handicapping of diﬀerent
players (where the state variable is the gap between the two players in a dynamic tournament).
To the best of our knowledge, these types of schemes have not been considered in this literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic environment.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium under uniform IPR policy. Section 4 extends these
results to the case in which IPR policy is state dependent. Section 5 quantitatively evaluates
the implications of various diﬀerent types of IPR policy regimes on economic growth and
characterizes the growth-maximizing state-dependent IPR policies. Section 6 concludes, while
the Appendix contains the proofs of all the results stated in the text.
2M o d e l
We now describe the basic environment. The characterization of the equilibrium under the
diﬀerent policy regimes is presented in the next section.
2.1 Preferences and Technology
Consider the following continuous time economy with a unique ﬁnal good. The economy is
populated by a continuum of 1 individuals, each with 1 unit of labor endowment, which they




exp(−ρ(s − t))logC (s)ds, (1)
where Et denotes expectations at time t, ρ>0 i st h ed i s c o u n tr a t ea n dC (t) is consumption
at date t. The logarithmic preferences in (1) facilitate the analysis, since they imply a simple
relationship between the interest rate, growth rate and the discount rate (see (2) below).
Let Y (t) be the total production of the ﬁnal good at time t. We assume that the economy
is closed and the ﬁnal good is used only for consumption (i.e., there is no investment), so that







= r(t) − ρ, (2)
where this equation deﬁnes g (t) as the growth rate of consumption and thus output, and r(t)
is the interest rate at date t.






where y(j,t) is the output of jth intermediate at time t. Throughout, we take the price of the
ﬁnal good as the numeraire and denote the price of intermediate j at time t by p(j,t).W e
also assume that there is free entry into the ﬁnal good production sector. These assumptions,
together with the Cobb-Douglas production function (3), imply that each ﬁnal good producer




, ∀j ∈ [0,1]. (4)
Each intermediate j ∈ [0,1] comes in two diﬀerent varieties, each produced by one of two
inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms. We assume that these two varieties are perfect substitutes and these
ﬁrms compete a la Bertrand.9 Firm i =1or 2 in industry j has the following technology
y(j,t)=qi (j,t)li (j,t) (5)
where li (j,t) is the employment level of the ﬁrm and qi (j,t) is its level of technology at
time t. The only diﬀerence between two ﬁrms is their technology, which will be determined
endogenously.
Each consumer in the economy holds a balanced portfolio of the shares of all ﬁrms. Con-
sequently, the objective function of each ﬁrm is to maximize expected proﬁts.
The production function for intermediate goods, (5), implies that the marginal cost of





where w(t) is the wage rate in the economy at time t.
When this causes no confusion, we denote the technological leader in each industry by i
and the follower by −i,s ot h a tw eh a v e :
qi (j,t) ≥ q−i (j,t).
9Alternatively, we can assume that these two varieties are imperfect substitutes, for example, so that the










with σ>1. This generalization has no eﬀect on any of our qualitative results, but increases notation. We
therefore prefer to focus on the case where the two varieties are perfect substitutes.
7Bertrand competition between the two ﬁrms implies that all intermediates will be supplied by










2.2 Technology, R&D and IPR Policy
R&D by the leader or the follower stochastically leads to innovation. We assume that when
the leader innovates, its technology improves by a factor λ>1.
The follower, on the other hand, can undertake R&D to catch up with the frontier tech-
nology or to improve over the frontier technology.11 The ﬁrst possibility, catch-up R&D, can
be thought of as discovering an alternative way of performing the same task as the current
leading-edge technology (applied to the follower’s variant of the product). We assume that
because this innovation is for the follower’s variant of the product and results from its own
R&D eﬀorts, it does not constitute infringement of the patent of the leader, and the follower
does not have to make any payments to the technological leader in the industry. Therefore, if
the follower chooses the ﬁr s tp o s s i b i l i t y ,i tw i l lh a v et or e t r ace the steps of the technological
leader (as applied to its own variant of the product), but in return, it will not have to pay a
patent fee. For follower ﬁrm −i in industry j at time t,w ed e n o t et h i st y p eo fR & Db y
a−i (j,t)=0 .
The alternative, frontier R&D, involves followers building on and improving the current
leading-edge technology. If this type of R&D succeeds, the follower will have improved the
leading-edge technology using the patented knowledge of the technological leader, and thus
will have to pay a pre-speciﬁed patent fee to the leader.12 We specify the patent fees below.
10If the leader were to charge a higher price, then the market would be captured by the follower earning
positive proﬁts. A lower price can always be increased while making sure that all ﬁnal good producers still
prefer the intermediate supplied by the leader i rather than that by the follower −i even if the latter were
supplied at marginal cost. Since the monopoly price with the unit elastic demand curve is inﬁnite, the leader
always gains by increasing its price, making the price given in (7) the unique equilibrium price.
11A third possibility is for the follower to climb the technology ladder step-by-step, meaning that, for example,
when the current leader is at some technology rung nij (t) and the follower itself is at n−ij (t) <n ij (t) − 1,
it must ﬁrst discover technology n−ij (t)+1 , et cetera. We have investigated this type of environment with
“slow catch-up” in a previous version of the paper. Since the general results are similar, we do not discuss this
variation to save space.
12Clearly, the follower will never license the technology of the leader for production purposes, since this would
lead to Bertrand competition and zero ex post proﬁts for both parties.
8This strategy is denoted by
a−i (j,t)=1 .
Throughout, we allow a−i (j,t) ∈ [0,1] for mathematical convenience, thus a should be inter-
preted as the probability of frontier R&D by the follower.
R&D by the leader, catch-up R&D by the follower, and frontier R&D by the follower
may have diﬀerent costs and success probabilities. Nevertheless, we simplify the analysis by
assuming that all three types of R&D have the same costs and the same probability of success.
In particular, in all cases, we assume that innovations follow a controlled Poisson process, with
the arrival rate determined by R&D investments. Each ﬁrm (in every industry) has access to
the following R&D technology:
xi (j,t)=F (hi (j,t)), (9)
where xi (j,t) is the ﬂow rate of innovation at time t and hi (j,t) is the number of workers
hired by ﬁrm i in industry j to work in the R&D process at t. This speciﬁcation implies that
within a time interval of ∆t, the probability of innovation for this ﬁrm is xi (j,t)∆t + o(∆t).
We assume that F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes F0 (·) > 0,F 00 (·) < 0,
F0 (0) < ∞ and that there exists ¯ h ∈ (0,∞) such that F0 (h)=0for all h ≥ ¯ h.T h e
assumption that F0 (0) < ∞ implies that there is no Inada condition when hi (j,t)=0 .T h e
last assumption, on the other hand, ensures that there is an upper bound on the ﬂow rate of
innovation (which is not essential but simpliﬁes the proofs). Recalling that the wage rate for
labor is w(t), the cost for R&D is therefore w(t)G(xi (j,t)) where
G(xi (j,t)) ≡ F−1 (xi (j,t)), (10)
and the assumptions on F immediately imply that G is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
satisﬁes G0 (·) > 0,G 00 (·) > 0, G0 (0) > 0 and limx→¯ x G0 (x)=∞,w h e r e




is the maximal ﬂow rate of innovation (with ¯ h deﬁned above).
We next describe the evolution of technologies within each industry. Suppose that leader i
in industry j at time t has a technology level of
qi (j,t)=λnij(t), (12)
and that the follower −i’s technology at time t is
q−i (j,t)=λn−ij(t), (13)
9where nij (t) ≥ n−ij (t) and nij (t), n−ij (t) ∈ Z+ denote the technology rungs of the leader and
the follower in industry j. We refer to nj (t) ≡ nij (t)−n−ij (t) as the technology gap in industry
j. If the leader undertakes an innovation within a time interval of ∆t, then its technology
increases to qi (j,t + ∆t)=λnijt+1 and technology gap rises to nj (t + ∆t)=nj (t)+1(the
probability of two or more innovations within the interval ∆t will be o(∆t),w h e r eo(∆t)
represents terms that satisfy lim∆t→0 o(∆t)/∆t).
When the follower is successful in catch-up R&D (i.e., a−i (j,t)=0 ) within the interval
∆t, then it catches up with the leader and its technology improves to
q−i (j,t + ∆t)=λnijt,
and the technology gap variable becomes njt+∆t =0 . In contrast, if the follower is successful
in frontier R&D and pays the license fee (i.e., a−i (j,t)=1 ), then it surpasses the leading-edge
technology, so we have
q−i (j,t + ∆t)=λnijt+1
and the technology gap variable becomes njt+∆t =1(and from this point onwards, the labels
i and −i are swapped, since the previous follower now becomes the leader).
In addition to catching up with or surpassing the technology frontier with their own
R&D, followers can also copy the technology frontier because IPR policy is such that some
patents expire. In particular, we assume that patents expire at some policy-determined Poisson
rate η, and after expiration followers can costlessly copy the frontier technology, jumping to
q−i (j,t + ∆t)=λnijt.13
This description makes it clear that there are two aspects to IPR policy: (i) the length of
the patent; (ii) license fees. In our most general policy regime, we allow both of these to be
state dependent, so they are represented by the following two functions:
η : N → R+
and for all t ≥ 0,
ζ (t):N → R+ ∪ {+∞}.
Here η(n) ≡ ηn < ∞ is the ﬂow rate at which the patent protection is removed from a
technological leader that is n steps ahead of the follower. When ηn =0 , this implies that there
is full protection at technology gap n, in the sense that patent protection will never be removed.
13Alternative modeling assumptions on IPR policy, such as a ﬁxed patent length of T>0 from the time of
innovation, are not tractable, since they introduce a form of delayed-diﬀerential equations.
10In contrast, ηn →∞implies that patent protection is removed immediately once technology
gap n is reached. Similarly, ζ (n,t) ≡ ζn (t) denotes the patent fee that a follower has to pay in
order to build upon the innovation of the technological leader, when the technology gap in the
industry is n steps.14 Our formulation imposes that η ≡{η1,η2,...} is time-invariant, while
ζ (t)≡{ζ1 (t),ζ2 (t),...} is a function of time. This is natural, since in a growing economy,
license fees should not remain constant. Below, we will require that ζ grows at the same rate
as aggregate output in the economy.
When ζn (t)=0 , there is no protection because followers can license the leading-edge
technology at zero cost.15 In contrast, when ζn (t)=∞, licensing the leading-edge technology
is prohibitively costly. Note however that ζn < ∞ does not necessarily imply that patent
protection is imperfect. In particular, in what follows we will interpret a situation in which
the license fee is equal to the net extra gain from surpassing the leader rather than being neck-
and-neck (i.e., being at a technology gap of 0) as “full protection”.16 We also refer to a policy
regime as uniform IPR protection if both η and ζ (t) are constant functions, meaning that
intellectual property law treats all ﬁrms and industries identically irrespective of the technology
gap between the leader and the follower (i.e., ηuni≡{η,η,...} and ζuni (t)≡{ζ (t),ζ(t),...}).
We also assume that there exists some ¯ n<∞ such that ηn = η¯ n and ζn (t)=ζ¯ n (t) for all
n ≥ ¯ n.
Given this speciﬁcation, we can now write the law of motion of the technology gap in
14Throughout, we assume that ζ is a policy choice and ﬁrms cannot contract around it. An alternative
approach would be to allow ﬁrms to bargain over the level of license fees. In this case, it is plausible to presume
that the legally-speciﬁed infringement penalties or license fees will aﬀect the equilibrium in the bargaining game,
so the eﬀect of policies we investigate would still be present. We do not allow bargaining between ﬁrms over
the license fees in order to simplify the analysis.
15Throughout, we interpret ζn (t)=0as ζn (t)=ε with ε ↓ 0, so that followers continue not to license the
new technology without innovation (recall the comment in footnote 12).
16In other words, we interpret “full protection” to correspond to a situation in which ζn (t)=V1 (t) − V0 (t),
where V1 refers to the net present value of a ﬁrm that is one step ahead of its rival and V0 is the value of a ﬁrm
that is neck-and-neck with its rival (naturally, ζn (t) >V 1 (t) − V0 (t) would also correspond to full protection,
since in this case no follower would choose to license). Alternatively, full protection could be interpreted as
corresponding to the case in which the follower pays a license fee equal to the loss of proﬁts that it causes for
the technology leader (see Scotchmer, 2005). In our model, this would correspond to ζn (t)=V0 (t) − V−1 (t),
where V−1 is the net present value of a ﬁrm that is one step behind the technology leader. This expression
applies, since without licensing the follower would have made its own innovation, in which case the leader would
have fallen to the state of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm rather than being surpassed by one step. In all equilibria we
compute below, we ﬁnd that the second amount is signiﬁcantly less than the ﬁrst, thus our interpretation of full
protection licensing fee is large enough to cover both possibilities. In any case, what value of ζ is designated
as “full protection” does not have any bearing on our formal analysis, since we characterize the equilibrium for
any ζ and then ﬁnd the growth-maximizing policy sequence.
11industry j as follows:
nj (t + ∆t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨







xi (j,t)∆t + a−i (j,t)x−i (j,t)∆t + o(∆t)
³










Here o(∆t) again represents second-order terms, in particular, the probabilities of more than
one innovations within an interval of length ∆t. The terms xi (j,t) and x−i (j,t) are the ﬂow
rates of innovation by the leader and the follower; a−i (j,t) ∈ [0,1] denotes whether the follower
is trying to catch up with a leader or surpass it; and ηnj(t) is the ﬂow rate at which the follower
is allowed to copy the technology of a leader that is nj (t) steps ahead. Intuitively, when
a−i (j,t)=1 , the technology gap in industry j increases from nj (t) to nj (t)+1if either the
leader is successful (ﬂow rate xi (j,t)) or if the follower is successful (ﬂow rate x−i (j,t)).
2.3 Proﬁts
We next write the instantaneous “operating” proﬁts for the leader (i.e., the proﬁts exclusive
of R&D expenditures and license fees). Proﬁts of leader i in industry j at time t are
















where nj (t) ≡ nij (t)−n−ij (t) is the technology gap in industry j at time t.T h eﬁrst line simply
uses the deﬁnition of operating proﬁts as price minus marginal cost times quantity sold. The
second line uses the fact that the equilibrium limit price of ﬁrm i is pi (j,t)=w(t)/q−i (j,t)
as given by (7), and the ﬁnal equality uses the deﬁnitions of qi (j,t) and q−i (j,t) from (12)
and (13). The expression in (15) also implies that there will be zero proﬁts in an industry that
is neck-and-neck, i.e., in industries with nj (t)=0 . Also clearly, followers always make zero
proﬁts, since they have no sales.
The Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function in (3) is responsible for the form of the
proﬁts (15), since it implies that proﬁts only depend on the technology gap of the industry
and aggregate output. This will simplify the analysis below by making the technology gap in
each industry the only industry-speciﬁcp a y o ﬀ-relevant state variable.
12The objective function of each ﬁrm is to maximize the net present discounted value of net
proﬁts (operating proﬁts minus R&D expenditures and plus or minus patent fees). In doing
this, each ﬁrm will take the sequence of interest rates, [r(t)]t≥0, the sequence of aggregate
output levels, [Y (t)]t≥0, the sequence of wages, [w(t)]t≥0, the R&D decisions of all other ﬁrms




n=0 denote the distribution of industries over diﬀerent technology gaps, with
P∞
n=0 µn (t)=1 . For example, µ0 (t) denotes the fraction of industries in which the ﬁrms are
neck-and-neck at time t. Throughout, we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), where
strategies are only functions of the payoﬀ-relevant state variables.17 This allows us to drop
the dependence on industry j, thus we refer to R&D decisions by xn for the technological
leader that is n steps ahead and by a−n and x−n for a follower that is n steps behind. Let
us denote the list of decisions by the leader and follower with technology gap n at time t
by ξn (t) ≡ hxn (t),p i (j,t),y i (j,t)i and ξ−n (t) ≡ ha−n (t),x −n (t)i.18 Throughout, ξ will
indicate the whole sequence of decisions at every state, ξ(t) ≡ {ξn (t)}
∞
n=−∞ . We deﬁne an
allocation as follows:




be the IPR policy sequences. Then an allo-
cation is a sequence of decisions for a leader that is n =0 ,1,...,∞ step ahead, [ξn (t)]t≥0,





sequence of wage rates [w(t)]t≥0, and a sequence of industry distributions over technology gaps
[µ(t)]t≥0.
For given IPR sequences η and [ζ (t)]t≥0, MPE strategies, which are only a function of the
payoﬀ-relevant state variables, can be represented as follows




17MPE is a natural equilibrium concept in this context, since it does not allow for implicit collusive agreements
between the follower and the leader. While such collusive agreements may be likely when there are only two
ﬁrms in the industry, in most industries there are many more ﬁrms and also many potential entrants, making
collusion more diﬃcult. Throughout, we assume that there are only two ﬁr m st ok e e pt h em o d e lt r a c t a b l e .
18The price and output decisions, pi (j,t) and yi (j,t), depend not only on the technology gap, aggregate
output and the wage rate, but also on the exact technology rung of the leader, nij (t). With a slight abuse of
notation, throughout we suppress this dependence, since their product pi (j,t)yi (j,t) and the resulting proﬁts
for the ﬁr m ,( 1 5 ) ,a r ei n d e p e n d e n to fnij (t), and only the technology gap, nj (t), matters for proﬁts, R&D,
aggregate output and economic growth.
13The ﬁrst function represents the R&D decision of a ﬁr m( b o t hw h e ni ti saf o l l o w e ra n dw h e n
it is a leader in an industry) with an n step technology gap (n ∈ Z), and the aggregate level of
output and the wage ((Y,w) ∈ R2
+). The second function represents the decision of a follower
(as a function of the level of output and the wage in the economy) of whether to direct its
R&D to reaching or surpassing the leading-edge technology (or more precisely, it represents
the probability with which the follower will choose to undertake R&D to surpass the leading
edge technology). Consequently, we have the following deﬁnition of equilibrium (below we will
deﬁne a steady-state equilibrium in terms of a solution to maximization problems):




,aM a r k o vP e r -
fect Equilibrium is given by a sequence [ξ∗ (t),w∗ (t),Y∗ (t)]t≥0 such that (i) [p∗
i (j,t)]t≥0
and [y∗
i (j,t)]t≥0 implied by [ξ∗ (t)]t≥0 satisfy (7) and (8); (ii) R&D policies [a∗ (t),x∗ (t)]t≥0
are best responses to themselves, i.e., [a∗ (t),x∗ (t)]t≥0 maximizes the expected proﬁts of ﬁrms





the R&D policies of other ﬁrms [a∗ (t),x∗ (t)]t≥0 as given; (iii) aggregate output [Y ∗ (t)]t≥0 is
given by (3); and (iv) the labor market clears at all times given the wage sequence [w∗ (t)]t≥0.
2.5 The Labor Market
Since only the technological leader produces, labor demand in industry j with technology gap




for n ∈ Z+. (16)
In addition, there is demand for labor coming for R&D from both followers and leaders in all
industries. Using (9) and the deﬁnition of the G function, we can express industry demands





G(xn (t)) + G(x−n (t)) if n ∈ N
2G(x0 (t)) if n =0
, (17)
where n<0 refers to the demand of a follower in an industry with a technology gap of n.
Note that in this expression, x−n (t) refers to the R&D eﬀort of a follower that is n steps
behind (conditional on its optimal choice of a−n (t) ∈ [0,1]). Moreover, this expression takes
into account that in an industry with neck-and-neck competition, i.e., with n =0 , there will
be twice the demand for R&D coming from the two ﬁrms.







ω(t)λn + G(xn (t)) + G(x−n (t))
¸
, (18)





is the labor share at time t. The labor market clearing condition, (18), uses the fact that total
supply is equal to 1, and the demand cannot exceed this amount. If demand falls short of 1,
then the wage rate, w(t), and thus the labor share, ω(t), have to be equal to zero (though
this will never be the case in equilibrium). The right-hand side of (18) consists of the demand
for production (the terms with ω in the denominator), the demand for R&D workers from the
neck-and-neck industries (2G(x0 (t)) when n =0 ) and the demand for R&D workers coming
from leaders and followers in other industries (G(xn (t)) + G(x−n (t)) when n>0).
Deﬁning the index of aggregate quality in this economy by the aggregate of the qualities









2.6 Steady State and the Value Functions
Let us now focus on steady-state (Markov Perfect) equilibria, where the distribution of in-
dustries µ(t) ≡ {µn (t)}
∞
n=0 is stationary, ω(t) deﬁned in (19) and g, the growth rate of the
economy, are constant over time. We will establish the existence of such an equilibrium and
characterize a number of its properties. If the economy is in steady state at time t =0 ,t h e n
by deﬁnition, we have Y (t)=Y0eg∗t and w(t)=w0eg∗t,w h e r eg∗ is the steady-state growth
rate. The two equations also imply that ω(t)=ω∗ for all t ≥ 0. Throughout, we assume that
the parameters are such that the steady-state growth rate g∗ is positive but not large enough
to violate the transversality conditions. This implies that net present values of each ﬁrm at all
p o i n ti nt i m ew i l lb eﬁnite and enable us to write the maximization problem of a leader that
is n>0 steps ahead recursively.
F i r s tn o t et h a tg i v e na no p t i m a lp o l i c yˆ x for a ﬁrm, the net present discounted value of a




exp(−r(s − t))[Π(s)+Z (s) − w(s)G(ˆ x(s))]ds











dj, where the second equality uses
(16). Thus we have lnY (t)=
U 1
0 [lnqi (j,t)+l nY (t) − lnw(t) − nj lnλ]dj. Rearranging and canceling terms,
and writing exp
U
nj lnλdj = λ
−
S∞
n=0 nµn(t), we obtain (21).
15where Π(s) is the operating proﬁta tt i m es ≥ t, Z (s) is the patent license fees received (or
paid) by a ﬁrm which is the leader and w(s)G(ˆ x(s)) denotes the R&D expenditure at time
s ≥ t. All variables are stochastic and depend on the evolution of the technology gap within
the industry.
Next taking the equilibrium R&D policy of other ﬁrms, x∗
−n (t) and a∗
−n (t), and equilibrium
wage rate, w∗ (t), as given, this value can be written as:20
Vn (t)=m a x
xn(t)
{[Πn (t) − w∗ (t)G(xn (t))]∆t + o(∆t) (22)
+exp(−r(t + ∆t)∆t)
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣









−n (t)∆t + o(∆t)
¢





−n (t)∆t + o(∆t)
¢
(V−1 (t + ∆t)+ζn)
+
¡
1 − xn (t)∆t − ηn∆t − x∗
−n (t)∆t − o(∆t)
¢
Vn (t + ∆t)
⎤




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
.
The ﬁrst part of this expression is the ﬂow proﬁts minus R&D expenditures during a time
interval of length ∆t. The second part is the continuation value after this interval has elapsed.
Vn+1 (t) and V0 (t) are deﬁned as net present discounted values for a leader that is n+1steps
ahead and a ﬁrm in an industry that is neck-and-neck (i.e., n =0 ). The second part of the
expression uses the fact that in a short time interval ∆t, the probability of innovation by the
leader is xn (t)∆t + o(∆t),w h e r eo(∆t) again denotes second-order terms. This explains the
ﬁrst line of the continuation value. For the remainder of the continuation value, note that the






−n (t)∆t + o(∆t);
in particular, if a∗
−n (t)=1 , this eventually will never happen, since the follower would be
undertaking R&D not to catch up but to surpass the leader. This explains the third line,
which applies when a∗
−n (t)=1 . There are two diﬀerences between the second and third lines;
(i) in the third line, conditional on success by the follower, a leader moves to the position
of a follower rather than a neck-and-neck ﬁrm (V−1 instead of V0); (ii) it receives the state-
dependent patent fee ζn. Finally, the last line applies when no R&D eﬀort is successful and
patents continue to be enforced, so that the technology gap remains at n steps.
Next, subtract Vn (t) from both sides, divide everything by ∆t, and take the limit as ∆t → 0.
20Clearly, this value function could be written for any arbitrary sequence of R&D policies of other ﬁrms. We
set the R&D policies of other ﬁrms to their equilibrium values, x
∗
−n (t) and a
∗
−n (t), to reduce notation in the
main body of the paper.
16This yields:
r(t)Vn (t) − ˙ Vn (t)=m a x
xn(t)
















[ζn + V0 (t) − V−1 (t)]},
where ˙ Vn (t) denotes the derivative of Vn (t) with respect to time. In steady state, the net
present value of a ﬁrm that is n steps ahead, Vn (t), will also grow at a constant rate g∗ for all





for all n ∈ Z, which will be independent of time in steady state, i.e., vn (t)=vn. Similarly, in





which will ensure the existence of a (stationary) steady-state equilibrium (the use of ζn (t) for
the original patent fees and ζn for the scaled-up fees should not cause any confusion).
Using (24) and the fact that from (2), r(t)=g(t)+ρ, the recursive form of the steady-state
value function (23) can be written as:
















−n [v−1 − vn + ζn]} for n ∈ N,
where x∗
−n is the equilibrium value of R&D by a follower that is n steps behind, and ω∗ is the
steady-state labor share (while xn is now explicitly chosen to maximize vn).
Similarly the value for neck-and-neck ﬁrms is
ρv0 =m a x
x0
{−ω∗G(x0)+x0 [v1 − v0]+x∗
0 [v−1 − v0]}, (26)
while the values for followers are given by
ρv−n =m a x
x−n,a−n
{−ω∗G(x−n)+[ ( 1− a−n)x−n + ηn][v0 − v−n] (27)
+a−nx−n [v1 − v−n − ζn]+x∗
n [v−n−1 − v−n]} for n ∈ N,
which takes into account that if the follower decides to build upon the leading-edge technology
it will become the new leader, but will have to pay the patent fee ζn.
17For neck-and-neck ﬁrms and followers, there are no instantaneous proﬁts, which is reﬂected
in (26) and (27). In the former case this is because neck-and-neck ﬁrms sell at marginal cost,
and in the latter case, because followers have no sales. These normalized value functions
emphasize that, because of growth, the eﬀective discount rate is r(t) − g(t)=ρ rather than
r(t).
The maximization problems in (25)-(26) immediately imply that any steady-state equilib-






=1 if v1 − ζn >v 0
∈ [0,1] if v1 − ζn = v0








































where G0−1 (·) is the inverse of the derivative of the G function, and since G is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and strictly concave, G0−1 is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing.
These equations therefore imply that innovation rates, the x∗
n’s, will increase whenever the
incremental value of moving to the next step is greater and when the cost of R&D, as measured
by the normalized wage rate, ω∗, is less. Note also that since G0 (0) > 0,t h e s eR & Dl e v e l sc a n
be equal to zero, which is taken care of by the max operator.
The response of innovation rates, x∗
n, to the increments in values, vn+1 − vn,i st h ek e y
economic force in this model. For example, a policy that reduces the patent protection of
leaders that are n +1steps ahead (by increasing ηn+1 or reducing ζn+1)w i l lm a k eb e i n g
n +1steps ahead less proﬁtable, thus reduce vn+1 − vn and x∗
n. This corresponds to the
standard disincentive eﬀect of relaxing IPR policy. In contrast to existing models, however,
here relaxing IPR policy can also create a positive incentive eﬀect. This positive incentive
eﬀect has two components. First, as equation (30) shows, weaker patent protection in the
form of lower license fees (lower ζ) may encourage further frontier R&D by the followers,
directly contributing to aggregate growth. Second and perhaps somewhat more paradoxically,
lower protection for technological leaders that are n +1steps ahead will tend to reduce vn+1,
thus increasing vn+2 − vn+1 and x∗
n+1.W ew i l ls e et h a tt h i sl a t t e re ﬀect plays an important
18role in the form of optimal state-dependent IPR policy. Finally, relaxing IPR protection
may also create a beneﬁcial composition eﬀect; this is because, typically, {vn+1 − vn}
∞
n=0 is a
decreasing sequence, which implies that x∗
n−1 is higher than x∗
n for n ≥ 1 (see Propositions
4 and 5 below). Weaker patent protection (in the form of shorter patent lengths) will shift
more industries into the neck-and-neck state and potentially increase the equilibrium level of
R&D in the economy.21 The optimal level and structure of IPR policy in this economy will be
determined by the interplay of these three forces.
Given the equilibrium R&D decisions ha∗, x∗i, the steady-state distribution of industries







































The ﬁrst expression equates exit from state n+1(which takes the form of the leader going one
more step ahead or the follower catching up for surpassing the leader) to entry into the state
(which takes the form of a leader from the state n making one more innovation). The second
equation, (33), performs the same accounting for state 1, taking into account that entry into
this state comes from innovation by either of the two ﬁrms that are competing neck-and-neck.
Finally, equation (34) equates exit from state 0 with entry into this state, which comes from
innovation by a follower in any industry with n ≥ 1.














and ω∗ ≥ 0,( 3 5 )
with complementary slackness.
The next proposition characterizes the steady-state growth rate. As with all the other
results in the paper, the proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Let the steady-state distribution of industries and R&D decisions be given by


















21W e a k e rp a t e n tp r o t e c t i o na l s oc r e a t e sab e n e ﬁcial “level eﬀect” by aﬀecting equilibrium prices (as shown in
equation (7) above) and by reallocating some of the workers engaged in “duplicative” R&D to production.
19This proposition clariﬁes that the steady-state growth rate of the economy is determined
by three factors:








3. Whether followers are undertaking R&D to catch up with the frontier or to surpass the




IPR policy aﬀects these three margins in diﬀerent directions as illustrated by the discussion
above.
We now deﬁne a steady-state equilibrium in a more convenient form, which will be used to
establish existence and derive some of the properties of the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3 (Steady-State Equilibrium) G i v e na nI P Rp o l i c yhη, ζi, a steady-state equi-
librium is a tuple hµ∗, v, a∗, x∗,ω ∗,g ∗i such that the distribution of industries µ∗ satisfy
(32), (33) and (34), the values v ≡{vn}
∞
n=−∞ satisfy (25), (26) and (27), the R&D decisions
a∗ and x∗ are given by (28), (29), (30) and (31), the steady-state labor share ω∗ satisﬁes (35)
and the steady-state growth rate g∗ is given by (36).
We next provide a characterization of the steady-state equilibrium, starting ﬁrst with the
case in which there is uniform IPR policy.
3 Uniform IPR Policy
Let us ﬁrst assume that the only available policy option is uniform IPR policy, whereby ηn =
η<∞ and ζn = ζ<∞ for all n ∈ N, which we denote by ηuni and ζuni. In this case,
(27) implies that the problem is identical for all followers, so that v−n = v−1 for n ∈ N.
Consequently, (27) can be replaced with the following simpler equation:
ρv−1 =m a x
x−1,a−1
{−ω∗G(x−1)+[ ( 1− a−1)x−1 + η][v0 − v−1]+a−1x−1 [v1 − v−1 − ζ]}, (37)
implying optimal R&D decisions for all followers of the form
x∗










Let us denote the sequence of value functions under uniform IPR as {vn}
∞
n=−1.W es t a r t
with a number of results that characterize the form of a steady-state equilibrium in this econ-
omy.






−1, x∗,ω ∗,g ∗®
is a steady-state equilibrium. Then, v−1 ≤ v0 and {vn}
∞
n=0 forms a
bounded and strictly increasing sequence converging to some positive value v∞.
The next result shows that we can restrict attention to a ﬁnite sequence of values:
Proposition 3 Consider a uniform IPR policy
­
ηuni, ζuni®




−1, x∗,ω ∗,g ∗®
. Then, there exists n∗ ∈ N such that x∗
n =0for all
n ≥ n∗.
The next proposition shows that x∗ ≡ {x∗
n}
∞
n=1 is a decreasing sequence, which implies that
technological leaders that are further ahead undertake less R&D. Intuitively, the beneﬁts of
further R&D are decreasing in the technology gap, since greater values of the technology gap
translate into smaller increases in the equilibrium markup (recall (15)).
Proposition 4 Consider a uniform IPR policy ηuni and ζuni. Then in any steady-state equi-
librium with uniform IPR, x∗
n+1 ≤ x∗




A ﬁnal comparison is between the R&D levels of neck and-and-neck ﬁrms, x∗
0,a n dt h e
R&D investments of followers and leaders in industries with a technology gap of n =1 , x∗
−1
and x∗




1, so that without licensing,
neck-and-neck industries are “most R&D intensive”.









> 0 and ζ>0,t h e nx∗
0 >x ∗
−1.




> 0 here ensures that there will be positive R&D
in the steady-state equilibrium (see Remark 1 below and Lemma 1 in the Appendix).
Next, we prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium
­
µ∗, v,a ∗
−1, x∗,ω ∗,g ∗®
with
ω∗ < 1. A steady state with with ω∗ < 1 is economically more interesting, since when ω∗ =1 ,
there are no proﬁts, thus it must be the case that µ∗
0 =1(so that all ﬁrms are neck-and-neck
and there are no markups). Equation (36) together with µ∗
0 =1and x∗
n =0for all n ∈ Z+
would then imply that there is no economic growth, i.e., g∗ =0 .
Establishing the existence of a steady-state equilibrium in this economy is made compli-
cated by the fact that the equilibrium allocation cannot be represented as a solution to a
maximization problem. Instead, as emphasized by Deﬁnition 3, each ﬁrm maximizes its value
taking the R&D decisions of other ﬁrms as given; thus an equilibrium corresponds to a set of
21R&D decisions that are best responses to themselves and a labor share (wage rate) ω∗ that
clears the labor market. We establish the existence of a steady-state equilibrium in a number
of steps.
First, note that each xn belongs to a compact interval [0, ¯ x],w h e r e¯ x is the maximal ﬂow rate
of innovation deﬁned in (11) above. Now ﬁxal a b o rs h a r e˜ ω ∈ [0,1] and a sequence h˜ a−1,˜ xi of
(Markovian) steady-state strategies for all other ﬁrms in the economy, and consider the dynamic
optimization problem of a single ﬁrm. Our next result characterizes this problem and shows
that given some z ≡h˜ ω,˜ a−1,˜ xi, the value function of an individual ﬁrm is uniquely determined,
while its optimal R&D choices are given by a convex-valued correspondence. In what follows,
we denote sets and correspondences by uppercase letters and refer to their elements by lowercase
letters, e.g., a−1 (z) ∈ A−1 [z], xn (z) ∈ Xn [z].
Proposition 6 Consider a uniform IPR policy
­
ηuni, ζuni®
, and suppose that the labor share
and the R&D policies of all other ﬁrms are given by z =h˜ ω,˜ a−1,˜ xi. Then the dynamic opti-
mization problem of an individual ﬁrm leads to a unique value function v[z]:{−1}∪Z+ → R+
and optimal R&D policies A−1 [z] ⊂ [0,1] and X[z]:{−1} ∪ Z+ ⇒ [0, ¯ x] are compact and
convex-valued for each z ∈ Z and upper hemi-continuous in z (where v[z] ≡ {vn [z]}
∞
n=−1 and
X[z] ≡ {Xn [z]}
∞
n=−1 ).
N o wl e tu ss t a r tw i t ha na r b i t r a r yz ≡h˜ ω,˜ a−1,˜ xi∈ Z ≡[0,1]
2 ×[0, ¯ x]
∞.F r o mP r o p o s i t i o n
6, this z is mapped into optimal R&D decision sets A−1 [z] and X[z],w h e r ea−1 ∈ A−1 [z] and
xn [z] ∈ Xn [z]. From R&D policies h˜ a−1,˜ xi, we calculate µ[˜ a−1,˜ x]≡{µn [˜ a−1,˜ x]}
∞
n=0 using
equations (32), (33) and (34). Then we can rewrite the labor market clearing condition (35)
as












≡ ϕ(˜ ω,˜ a−1,˜ x) (39)
where due to uniform IPR, x∗
−n = x∗
−1 for all n>0. Next, deﬁne the mapping (correspondence)
Φ[z] ≡ (ϕ(z),A −1 [z], X[z]), which maps Z into itself, that is,
Φ: Z ⇒ Z. (40)
That Φ maps Z into itself follows since z ∈ Z consists of ˜ a−1 ∈ [0,1], ˜ x ∈[0, ¯ x]
∞ and ˜ ω ∈ [0,1],
and the image of z under Φ consists of a−1 ∈ [0,1] and x ∈[0, ¯ x]
∞,a n dm o r e o v e r ,( 3 9 )i s
clearly in [0,1] (since the right-hand side is nonnegative and bounded above by 1). Finally,
22from Proposition 6, A−1 [z] and Xn [z] are compact and convex-valued for each z ∈ Z,a n da l s o
upper hemi-continuous in z,a n dϕ is continuous. Using this construction, we can establish:








> 0. Then a steady-state equilibrium
­
µ∗, v,a ∗
−1, x∗,ω ∗,g ∗®
exists. Moreover, in any steady-state equilibrium ω∗ < 1. In addition, if either η>0 or
x∗
−1 > 0,t h e ng∗ > 0.




> 0 is relaxed, then there exists
a trivial equilibrium in which x∗
n =0for all n ∈ Z+, i.e., an equilibrium in which there is no
innovation and thus no growth (this follows from Lemma 1 and from Propositions 4 and 5,
which imply that x∗
0 ≥ x∗
n for all n 6=0 ). Moreover, if η>0, then this equilibrium would also
involve µ∗
0 =1 , so that in every industry two ﬁrms with equal costs compete a la Bertrand
and charge price equal to marginal cost, leading to zero aggregate proﬁts and a labor share




> 0, on the other hand,
is suﬃc i e n tt or u l eo u tµ∗
0 =1and thus ω∗ =1 . If in addition the steady-state equilibrium
involves some probability of catch-up or innovation by the followers, i.e., either η>0 or
x∗
−1 > 0, then the growth rate is also strictly positive. A suﬃcient condition to ensure that
x∗





An immediate consequence of Proposition 3, combined with (32) is that µn =0for all
n ≥ n∗ (since there is no innovation in industries with technology gap greater than n∗). Thus
the law of motion of an industry can be represented by a ﬁnite Markov chain. Moreover,
because after an innovation by a follower, all industries jump to the neck-and-neck state (when
a∗
−1 =0 ) or to the technology gap of one (when a∗
−1 =1 ), this Markov chain is irreducible (and
aperiodic), thus converges to a unique steady-state distribution of industries. This is stated
and proved in the next proposition.
Proposition 8 Consider a uniform IPR policy
­
ηuni, ζuni®
and a steady-state equilibrium




. Then, there exists a unique steady-state distribution of
industries µ∗.
22To see why this condition is suﬃcient suppose that η =0and also that x
∗
−1 =0 . Then (37) immediately




/ρ. Moreover, from (38) and the fact that ω
















> 0 contradicts the
hypothesis that x
∗
−1 =0 ,a n di m p l i e sx
∗
−1 > 0. The reason why η>0 can, under some circumstances, contribute
to positive growth is related to the composition eﬀect discussed above.
234S t a t e - D e p e n d e n t I P R P o l i c y
We now extend the results from the previous section to the environment with state-dependent
IPR policy. The main results from the previous section generalize, but the argument is slightly
modiﬁed.
It is no longer necessarily the case that the sequence of values {vn}
∞
n=−∞ is increasing, since
IPR policies could be very sharply increasing, making a particular state very unattractive for
the leader.23 For this reason, we do not have the equivalent of Proposition 2. Nevertheless, it
can be established that only a ﬁnite number of states will have positive weight in the steady-
state distribution:
Proposition 9 Consider the state-dependent IPR policy hη, ζi, and suppose that
­
µ∗, v,a ∗
−1, x∗,ω ∗,g ∗®
is a steady-state equilibrium. Then there exists a state n∗ ∈ N
such that µ∗
n =0for all n ≥ n∗.
Because of the reasons highlighted in footnote 23, Proposition 4 may not necessarily hold
with state-dependent IPR. Nevertheless, the proofs of these propositions make it clear that
as long as hη,ζi is not too far from uniform IPR, the conclusions in these propositions will
continue to hold. In fact, our numerical results with optimal state-dependent IPR always verify
the conclusions of Proposition 4 (but interestingly not those of Proposition 5; see Figure 5 in
Section 5).
Our next result is a generalization of Proposition 6, which shows that each individual ﬁrm’s
maximization problem is well-behaved with state-dependent IPR.
Proposition 10 Consider the state-dependent IPR policy hη,ζi and suppose that the labor
share and the R&D policies of all other ﬁrms are given by z =h˜ ω,˜ a,˜ xi. Then the dynamic
optimization problem of an individual ﬁrm leads to a unique value function v[z]:Z → R+
and optimal R&D policies A[z]:Z−\{0} ⇒ [0,1] and X[z]:Z ⇒ [0, ¯ x] are compact and
convex-valued for each z ∈ Z and upper hemi-continuous in z (where v[z] ≡ {vn [z]}
∞
n=−1,
A[z] ≡ {An [z]}
−1
n=−∞ and X[z] ≡ {Xn [z]}
∞
n=−1 ).
Finally, the next result generalizes Proposition 7 and establishes the existence of a steady-
state equilibrium with positive growth.
23For example, we could have ηn =0and ηn+1 →∞ , which would imply that vn+1 − vn is negative.





> 0. Then a steady-state equilibrium
­
µ∗, v,a ∗
−1, x∗,ω ∗,g ∗®
exists. Moreover, in any steady-state equilibrium ω∗ < 1. In addition, if either η1 > 0 or
x∗
−1 > 0,t h e ng∗ > 0.
Although the analysis so far has established the existence of a steady-state equilibrium
and characterized some of its properties, it is not possible to determine the optimal state-
dependent IPR policy analytically. For this reason, in Section 5, we undertake a quantitative
investigation of the form and structure of optimal state-dependent IPR policy using plausible
parameter values.
5 Optimal IPR Policy: A Quantitative Investigation
In this section, we investigate the implications of various diﬀerent types of IPR policies on
the equilibrium growth and R&D rates using numerical computations of the steady-state equi-
librium. Our purpose is not to provide a detailed calibration of the model economy, but to
highlight the broad quantitative characteristicso ft h em o d e la n di t si m p l i c a t i o n sf o ro p t i m a l
IPR policy under plausible parameter values. As we will see, the structure of optimal IPR pol-
icy and the innovation gains from such policy are relatively invariant to the range of parameter
values we consider.
5.1 Methodology
We take the annual discount rate as 5%, i.e., ρyear =0 .05 and without loss of generality, we
normalize labor supply to 1. The theoretical analysis considered a general production function
for R&D given by (9). The empirical literature typically assumes a Cobb-Douglas production
function. For example, Kortum (1993) considers a function of the form
Innovation(t)=B0 exp(κt)(R&D inputs)
γ , (41)
where B0 is a constant and exp(κt) is a trend term, which may depend on general technological
trends, a drift in technological opportunities, or changes in general equilibrium prices (such as
wages of researchers etc.). The advantage of this form is not only its simplicity, but also the
fact that most empirical work estimates a single elasticity for the response of innovation rates
to R&D inputs. Consequently, they essentially only give information about the parameter γ
in terms of equation (41). A low value of γ implies that the R&D production function is more
concave. For example, Kortum (1993) reports that estimates of γ vary between 0.1 and 0.6
25(see also Pakes and Griliches, 1980, or Hall, Hausman and Griliches, 1988). For these reasons,
throughout, we adopt a R&D production function similar to (41):
x = Bhγ (42)
where B,γ > 0. In terms of our previous notation, equation (42) implies that G(x)=[ x/B]
1
γ w,
where w is the wage rate in the economy (thus in terms of the above function, it is captured by
the exp(κt) term).24 Equation (42) does not satisfy the boundary conditions we imposed so far
and can be easily modiﬁed to do so without aﬀecting any of the results, since in all numerical
exercises only a ﬁnite number of states are reached.25 Following the estimates reported in
Kortum (1993), we start with a benchmark value of γ =0 .35, and then report sensitivity
checks for γ =0 .1 and γ =0 .6. The other parameter in (42), B, is chosen so as to ensure
an annual growth rate of approximately 1.9%, i.e., g∗ ' 0.019, in the benchmark economy
which features indeﬁnitely-enforced patents and no licensing. This growth rate together with
ρyear =0 .05 also pins down the annual interest rate as ryear =0 .069 from equation (2).
We choose the value of λ using a reasoning similar to Stokey (1995). Equation (36) implies
that if the expected duration of time between any two consecutive innovations is about 3 years
in an industry, then a growth rate of about 1.9% would require λ =1 .05.26 We take λ =1 .05
as the benchmark value, and check the robustness of the results to λ =1 .01 and λ =1 .2
(expected duration of 1 year and 12 years, respectively). This completes all of the parameters
of the model except the IPR policy.
As noted above, we begin with the full patent protection regime without licensing, i.e.,
hη ={0,0,...},ζ = {∞,∞,...}i. We then compare this to an economy with full patent pro-





,w h e r e¯ ζ = v1 − v0.27 After this,




t h u sw o u l db ee q u i v a l e n tt o( 4 1 )a sl o n ga st h eg r o w t ho fw(t) can be approximated by constant rate.
25For example, we could add a small linear term to the production function for R&D, (42), and also make it
ﬂat after some level ¯ h. For example, the following generalization of (42),
x =m i n

Bh
γ + εh;B¯ h
γ + ε¯ h

for ε small and ¯ h large, makes no diﬀerence to our simulation results.
26In particular, in our benchmark parameterization with full protection without licensing, 24% of industries
are in the neck-and-neck state. This implies that improvements in the technological capability of the economy
is driven by the R&D eﬀorts of the leaders in 76% of the industries and the R&D eﬀorts of both the leaders and
the followers in 24% of the industries. Therefore, the growth equation implies that we have g ' lnλ×1.24×x,
where x denotes the average frequency of innovation in a given industry. A major innovation on average every
three years implies a value of λ ' 1.05.
27For the interpretation of full patent protection as ¯ ζ = v1−v0, recall the discussion in footnote 16. Note also
26we move to a comparison of the optimal (growth-maximizing) uniform IPR policy ηuni,ζuni
to the optimal state-dependent IPR policy. Since it is computationally impossible to calcu-
late the optimal value of each ηn and ζn, we limit our investigation to a particular form of
state-dependent IPR policy, whereby the same η and ζ applies to all industries that have a
technology gap of n =5or more. In other words, the IPR policy matrix takes the form:
IPR policy →










































We checked and veriﬁed that allowing for further ﬂexibility (e.g., allowing η5 and η6 or ζ5 and
ζ6 to diﬀer) has little eﬀect on our results.
The numerical methodology we pursue relies on uniformization and value function iteration.
The details of the uniformization technique are described in the proof of Proposition 6.O n
value function iteration, see Judd (1999). In particular, we ﬁrst take the IPR policies η and ζ
as given and make an initial guess for the equilibrium labor share ω∗. Then conditional on ω∗,




n=−1 depending on whether there is state-







and the steady-state distribution of industries, {µ∗
n}
∞
n=0. After convergence, we compute the
growth rate g∗, and then check for market clearing in the labor market from equation (18).
Depending on whether there is excess demand or supply of labor, ω∗ is varied and the whole
process is repeated until the entire steady-state equilibrium for a given IPR policy is computed.
The process is then repeated for diﬀerent IPR policies.
In the state-dependent IPR case, the optimal (growth-maximizing) IPR policy sequences,
η and ζ, are computed one element at a time, until we ﬁnd the growth-maximizing value for
that component, for example, η1. We then move the next component, for example, η2.O n c e
the growth-maximizing value of η2 is determined, we go back to optimize over η1 again, and
this procedure is repeated recursively until convergence.
We now present our simulation results. We start with the parameter values λ =1 .05 and
γ =0 .35, and then show how the results change when we vary these parameters.
5.2 Full IPR Protection Without Licensing
We start with the benchmark with full protection and no licensing, which is the case that the
existing literature has considered so far (e.g., Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers, 2001). In
that at a license fee of ¯ ζ, followers are indiﬀerent between a =0and a =1 , and in computing the equilibrium
in this case we always suppose that they choose a =1 . Thus alternatively one might wish to think that
¯ ζ = v1 − v0 − ε for ε ↓ 0.
27terms of our model, this corresponds to ηn =0for all n and ζn = ∞ for all n.E q u a t i o n
(28) implies that a∗
−n =0for all n. We choose the parameter B i nt e r m so f( 4 2 ) ,s ot h a tt h e
benchmark has an annual growth rate of 1.86%.
The value function for this benchmark case is s h o w ni nF i g u r e1( w i t ht h es o l i dl i n e ) .T h e
value function has decreasing diﬀerences for n ≥ 0, which is consistent with Proposition 4,
and features a constant level for all followers (since there is no state dependence in the IPR
policy). Figure 2 shows the level of R&D eﬀorts for leaders and followers in this benchmark
(again with the solid lines). This ﬁgure shows that the R&D level of a leader declines as the
technology gap increases. Moreover, consistent with Propositions 4 and 5, the highest level of
R&D is for ﬁrms that are neck-and-neck (i.e., at the technology gap of n =0 ). Since there is
no state-dependent IPR policy, all followers undertake the same level of R&D eﬀort, which is
a l s os h o w ni nt h eﬁgure.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of industries according to technology gaps (again the solid
line refers to the benchmark case). The mode of the distribution is at the technology gap of
n =1 , but there is also a concentration of industries at technology gap n =0 , because a∗
−n =0
implies that innovations by the followers take them to the “neck-and-neck” state.
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 also reports the results for this benchmark simulation. As noted
above, B is chosen such that the annual growth rate is equal to 0.0186, which is recorded at
the bottom row. The table also shows the gap between x∗
0 and x∗
−1 (0.029 versus 0.018), the
frequencies of industries with technology gaps of 0, 1 and 2. The steady-state value of ω is
0.952. Since labor is the only factor of production in the economy, ω∗ should not be thought
of as the labor share in GDP. Instead, 1 − ω∗ measures the share of pure monopoly proﬁts in
value added. In the benchmark parameterization, this corresponds to 5% of GDP, which is
reasonable.28 Finally, the table also shows that in this benchmark parameterization 3.2% of
the workforce is working as researchers, which is also consistent with US data.29
5.3 Full IPR Protection With Licensing
We next turn to full IPR protection with licensing. As speciﬁed above, we think of full IPR
protection with licensing as corresponding to ηn =0for all n (so that patents never expire)
and ζn = ¯ ζ ≡ v1 − v0 for all n (so that the license fee for making use of a leading-edge
technology is equal to the net present discounted value gap between being a one step ahead
28Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) reports that the ratio of before-tax proﬁts to GDP in the US economy
in 2001 was 7% and the after-tax ratio was 5%.
29According to National Science Foundation (2006), the ratio of scientists and engineers in the US workforce
in 2001 is about 4%.
28leader and a neck-and-neck ﬁrm). Figures 1-3 show the corresponding value functions, R&D
eﬀort levels and distribution of industries for this case (with the dashed lines). Since there is no
state-dependent policy the general pattern is similar to that in the economy without licensing.
T h e r ei sn ol o n g e ras p i k ei nR & De ﬀort at n =0 , however, since now ﬁr m sa l w a y sp r e f e rt o
pay the license and jump ahead of the leading-edge technology. This makes the neck-and-neck
state no longer special (in fact, as column 2 of Table 1 shows in equilibrium there will be no
industries in the neck-and-neck state). More importantly, the level of R&D by followers is
considerably higher than in the benchmark case. In particular, x∗
−1 is now 0.021 rather than
0.018. The resulting growth rate is 2.58% instead of 1.86% in the benchmark. The boost to
growth comes not from the increase in the R&D eﬀort overall, but from the fact that the R&D
of the followers now also advances the technological frontier of the economy since they can
license and build on the leading-edge technology (recall equation (36)). In fact, column 2 of
Table 1 shows that this considerably higher growth rate is achieved with a lower fraction of
the workforce, only 2.6%, working in the research sector.
This result, which is robust across diﬀerent parameterizations of the model, is the ﬁrst
important implication of our analysis. Relative to existing models of step-by-step innovation,
such as Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), which do not allow for the possibility of
licensing, here the R&D eﬀort by followers can directly contribute to economic growth and this
increases the equilibrium growth rate of the economy.
5.4 Optimal Uniform IPR Protection
We next turn to optimal (growth-maximizing) IPR policy with licensing. That is, we impose
that ηn = η and ζn = ζ for all n, and look for values of η and ζ that maximize the growth
rate. Column 3 of Table 1 shows that the growth-maximizing values of η and ζ are both equal
to 0 in the benchmark parameterization. This corresponds to zero license fees and indeﬁnite
life of patents, so that followers can never copy the leading-edge technology without R&D, but
they can always advance one step ahead of the leader when they are successful in their R&D
eﬀorts (without paying any license fees).
The resulting value function, R&D eﬀort levels and industry distributions according to
technology gaps are shown in Figures 4-6 (with the solid lines).
The ﬁgures and column 3 of Table 1 show that the growth-maximizing IPR policy discour-
ages leaders (which can be seen from the fact that v1−v0 declines signiﬁcantly), but encourages
R&D eﬀort by the followers, since when successful they do not have to pay the license fee. The
optimal uniform IPR increases the growth rate by only a little, however. While the growth
29rate of the economy with full IPR protection with licensing was 2.58%, it is now 2.63%. This
increase is associated with a very modest rise in the share of the labor force working in research
( f r o m2 . 6 %t o2 . 7 % ) .
5.5 Optimal State-Dependent IPR Without Licensing
We next turn to our second major question; whether state-dependent IPR makes a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence relative the uniform IPR. We ﬁrst investigate this question without licensing (so that
the comparison is to the benchmark case in column 1). In particular, we set ζn = ∞ for all n
and look for the combination of {η1,...,η5} that maximizes the growth rate. The results are
s h o w ni nc o l u m n4o fT a b l e1 .
Two features are worth noting. First, the growth rate increases noticeably relative to
column 1; it is now 2.03% instead of 1.86%. Nevertheless, this increase is quite small relative
to the beneﬁts of licensing. Therefore, state-dependent IPR policy with no licensing is not a
substitute for licensing.
Second, we see an interesting pattern (which is in fact quite general in all of our quantitative
investigations). The optimal state-dependent policy {η1,...,η5} provides greater protection to
technological leaders that are further ahead. In particular, we ﬁnd that the optimal policy
involves η1 =0 .054, η2 =0 .005,a n dη3 = η4 = η5 =0 . This corresponds to very little patent
protection for ﬁrms that are one step ahead of the followers, which can be seen by comparing
η1 =0 .054 to x∗
−1 =0 .010. This comparison implies that ﬁrms that are one step behind
followers are more than ﬁve times as likely to catch up with the technological leader because
of the expiration of the patent of the leader as they are likely to catch up because of their own
successful R&D. Then, there is a steep increase in the protection provided to technological
leaders that are two steps ahead, and η2 is 1/10th of η1. Perhaps even more remarkably, after
a technology gap of three or more steps, there is full protection and patents never expire.
This pattern of greater protection for technological leaders that are further ahead may
go against a naïve intuition that state-dependent IPR policy should try to boost the growth
rate of the economy by bringing more industries with large technology gaps (where leaders
engage in little R&D) into neck-and-neck competition. This composition eﬀect is present, but
it is dominated by another, more powerful force, the trickle-down eﬀect. The intuition for the
trickle-down eﬀect is as follows: by providing secure patent protection to ﬁrms that are three
or more steps ahead of their rivals, optimal state-dependent IPR increases the R&D eﬀort of
leaders that are one and two steps ahead as well–despite the fact that these ﬁrms now face
less secure protection of their own intellectual property. In fact, this is precisely because of
30low protection for technological leaders that are one or two steps ahead combined with the
promise of much greater protection once they reach a technology gap of three steps or more.
Mechanically, high levels of η1 and η2 reduce v1 and v2, while high IPR protection for more
advanced ﬁrms increases vn for n ≥ 3. Consequently, it becomes more beneﬁcial for leaders
that are one or two steps ahead to undertake R&D to reach the higher level of IPR protection.
This pattern of increased R&D for leaders under state-dependent IPR contrasts with uniform
IPR, which always reduces R&D by all technological leaders. The possibility that imperfect
state-dependent IPR protection can increase R&D incentives is a novel feature of our approach,
since previous models have not considered state-dependent IPR policies.
5.6 Optimal State-Dependent IPR With Licensing
Finally, we turn to the most general policy choice within the context of our approach and
investigate which combinations of {η1,...,η5} and {ζ1,...,ζ5} maximize the growth rate and
the contribution of the optimal state-dependent IPR policies to economic growth. The results
of this exercise are shown in column 5 of Table 1. Now the comparison should be to the optimal
uniform IPR policy with licensing in column 3, where uniform IPR policies η and ζ were chosen
to maximize the aggregate growth rate. The value functions, R&D eﬀorts and the industry
distribution over diﬀerent levels of technology gaps in this economy are shown in Figures 4-6
(with the dashed lines).
We see in column 5 that growth-maximizing IPR policy involves ηn =0for all n,s ot h a t
patents never expire. Nevertheless, IPR protection for technological leaders is not full. In
particular, the growth-maximizing policy involves ζ1 =0 , which implies that followers can
build on the leading-edge technology that is one step ahead of their own knowledge without
paying any license fees. From there on, ζ increases to ζ2 =0 .82, which is still less than full
patent protection. After three or more steps, however, we have ζ3 =1 .94 and ζ4 = ζ5 =1 .95,
which are very close to full patent protection (since v1 −v0 =1 .96). The resulting growth rate
of the economy is 2.96%, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the growth rate under uniform IPR
policy, 2.63% in column 3. This shows that state-dependent policies can increase the growth
rate of the economy signiﬁcantly.
State-dependent policies again achieve this superior growth performance by exploiting the
trickle-down eﬀect, which we already saw in the case without licensing. In particular, ζn is
an increasing sequence, which implies that technological leaders that are further ahead receive
greater protection. As in the previous subsection, this pattern of IPR is used as a way of
boosting the R&D eﬀort of technological leaders that are one or two steps ahead of their
31rivals (see Figure 5). Since these leaders receive little protection and understand that they can
increase both their proﬁts and their IPR protection by undertaking further innovations, they
have relatively strong innovation incentives and undertake high levels of R&D. This increases
the fraction of the labor force working in R&D to 3.9% (which is greater than all the other cases
in Table 1) and again illustrates how imperfect state-dependent IPR protection can increase
R&D incentives relative to full protection.
The growth rate of the economy also receives a boost from the R&D eﬀort of the follow-
ers that are one step behind the leaders, since, thanks to licensing, followers’ R&D directly
contributes to the advancing the technological frontier of the economy. Figure 5 shows that
followers that are one step behind the frontier now have a higher R&D eﬀo r tt h a ne v e ni nt h e
case with growth-maximizing uniform IPR (which involved ζn =0for all n). The reason for
this pattern of R&D eﬀorts is that the growth-maximizing IPR policy and the trickle-down
eﬀect have increased the value of being a technological leader. In contrast, the R&D level of
followers that are more than once step behind is lower than in the economy with uniform IPR.
Overall, the results show that state-dependent IPR policies can increase the equilibrium
growth rate of the economy substantially and that the trickle-down eﬀect is powerful, not only
when we consider the economy without licensing, but also in the presence of licensing.
5.7 Robustness
Tables 2-5 show the robustness of the patterns documented in Figures 1-6 and in Table 1.
In particular, each of these tables changes one of the two parameters λ and γ (increasing or
reducing λ to 1.2 or 1.01, and increasing or reducing γ to 0.6 or 0.1) and show the results
corresponding to each one of the ﬁve diﬀerent policy regimes and discussed so far. In each
case, we change the parameter B in equation (42) so that the growth rate of the benchmark
economy with full IPR protection without licensing is the same as in Table 1, 1.86%.
Notably, the qualitative, and even the quantitative, patterns in Table 1 are relatively robust.
In all cases we see a signiﬁcant increase in the growth rate when we allow licensing. The
smallest increase is when γ =0 .6, presumably because with limited diminishing returns to
R&D, incentives were already suﬃciently strong without licensing. As a result, in this case,
the growth rate increases only from 1.86% to 1.98%. In all other cases, allowing for licensing
increases the growth rate to above 2.5%, which is a very large increase relative to the baseline
of 1.86%.
Moreover, in all cases, moving to state-dependent IPR policy increases the growth rate
further, though the extent of the increase varies depending on parameters. The most modest
32gain comes when γ =0 .1, because in this case the economy with full protection and licensing
already achieves a very high growth rate of 2.78%, and thus there is only little room left for
an increase in growth rate from state-dependent IPR. In all other cases, the increase in the
growth rate is quite substantial.
Perhaps, more noteworthy is the fact that in all cases, growth-maximizing state-dependent
IPR is shaped by the trickle-down eﬀect. In all of the various parameterizations we have
considered, there is little or no protection provided to technological leaders that are one step
ahead, but IPR protection grows as the technology gap increases. This is the typical pattern
implied by the trickle-down eﬀect.
We therefore conclude that both the substantial beneﬁts of licensing in models of tech-
nological competition and the beneﬁts of state-dependent policies, mostly coming from the
trickle-down eﬀect, are robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we developed a general equilibrium framework to investigate the impact of the
extent and form of intellectual property rights (IPR) policy on economic growth. The two
major questions we focused on are whether licensing, which allows followers to build on the
leading-edge technology in return of a license fee, has a major impact on the equilibrium growth
rate and whether the same degree of patent protection should be given to companies that are
further ahead of their competitors as those that are technologically close to their competitors.
In our model economy, ﬁrms engage in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. Leaders can
innovate in order to widen the technology gap between themselves and the followers, which
enables them to charge higher markups. On the other hand, followers innovate to catch up with
or surpass the technological leaders in their industry. Followers can advance in three diﬀerent
ways. First, the patent of the technological leader may expire, allowing the follower in the
industry to copy the leading-edge technology. Second, each follower can undertake catch-up
R&D to improve its own variant of the product to catch up with the leader. Third, each
follower can undertake frontier R&D, building on and improving the leading-edge technology;
in this case, when successful, it will have to pay a license fee to the technological leader.
In the model economy, IPR policy regulates whether licensing is possible and how costly
it will be far followers, and also the length of the patents. We characterized the form of the
steady-state equilibrium and proved its existence under general IPR policies. We then used this
framework to investigate the form of “optimal” (growth-maximizing) IPR policy quantitatively.
33The major ﬁndings of this quantitative exercise are as follows:
1. A move from an IPR policy without licensing to one that allows for licensing has a signif-
icant eﬀect on the equilibrium growth rate. For the benchmark parameterization of our
model, licensing increases the growth rate from 1.86% to 2.58% per annum. This sub-
stantial increase in growth rate is robust to a large range of variation in the parameters.
2. State-dependent IPR also leads to a signiﬁcant improvement in the equilibrium growth
rate. In our benchmark parameterization, the growth rate of the economy increases from
2.57% under the growth-maximizing uniform IPR policy to 2.93% under state-dependent
IPR policy. Perhaps more interesting than this substantial impact on the equilibrium
growth rate is the form of the optimal state-dependent IPR policy. Contrary to a naïve
intuition, we ﬁnd that the growth-maximizing IPR policy provides greater protection to
ﬁrms that are further ahead of their rivals than those that are technologically close to
their competitors. Underlying this form of the optimal IPR policy is the trickle-down
eﬀect. The trickle-down eﬀect implies that providing greater protection to suﬃciently
advanced technological leaders not only increases their R&D eﬀorts, but also raises the
R&D eﬀorts of all technological leaders that are less advanced than this level, because
the reward to innovation now includes the greater protection that they will receive once
they reach this higher level of technology. Our results suggest that the trickle-down eﬀect
is powerful both with and without licensing, and its form and magnitude are relatively
insensitive to the exact parameter values used in the quantitative investigation.
The analysis in this paper suggests that a move to a richer menu of IPR policies, in
particular, a move towards optimal state-dependent policies with licensing may signiﬁcantly
increase innovation and economic growth. The results also show that the form of optimal
IPR policy may depend on the industry structure (and the technology of catch-up within the
industry). Nevertheless, these conclusions are based on a quantitative evaluation of a rather
simple model. It would be interesting to investigate the robustness of these results to diﬀerent
models of industry dynamics and study whether the relationship between the form of optimal
IPR policy and industry structure suggested by our analysis also applies when variation in
industry structure has other sources (for example, diﬀerences in the extent of ﬁxed costs). The
most important area for future work is a detailed empirical investigation of the form of optimal
IPR policy, using both better estimates of the eﬀects of IPR policy on innovation rates and
also structural models where the eﬀect of diﬀerent policies on equilibrium can be evaluated.
34Appendix: Proofs












Since ω(t)=ω∗ and {µ∗
n}
∞




lnQ(t + ∆t) − lnQ(t)
∆t
.
Now note the following: during an interval of length ∆t (i) in the fraction µ∗
n of the industries with
technology gap n ≥ 1 the leaders innovate at a rate x∗
n∆t + o(∆t); (ii) in the same industries, the
followers innovate at the rate a∗
−nx∗
−n∆t+o(∆t); (iii) in the fraction µ∗
0 of the industries with technology
gap of n =0 ,b o t hﬁrms innovate, so that the total innovation rate is 2x∗
0∆t + o(∆t)); and (iv) each
innovation increase productivity by a factor λ. Combining these observations, we have

















Subtracting lnQ(t), dividing by ∆t and taking the limit ∆t → 0 gives (36).






be the R&D decisions of the ﬁrm and {vn}
∞
n=−1







n=−1, ω∗ and g, as given. By choosing xn =0for all n ≥− 1,t h eﬁrm guarantees vn ≥ 0 for all
n ≥− 1.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eﬂow proﬁts a t i s f yπn ≤ 1 for all n ≥− 1, vn ≤ 1/ρ for all n ≥− 1, establishing
that {vn}
∞
n=−1 is a bounded sequence, with vn ∈ [0,1/ρ] for all n ≥− 1.
Proof of v1 >v 0 : Suppose, ﬁrst, v1 ≤ v0, then (31) implies x∗
0 =0 , and by the symmetry of the
problem in equilibrium (26) implies v0 = v1 =0 . As a result, from (30) we obtain x∗
−1 =0 .E q u a t i o n
(25) implies that when x∗




/(ρ + η) > 0, yielding a contradiction and proving that
v1 >v 0.
Proof of v−1 ≤ v0 : Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that v−1 >v 0.
If v1 − ζ ≤ v0, (30) yields x∗
−1 =0 . This implies v−1 = ηv0/(ρ + η),w h i c hc o n t r a d i c t sv−1 ≥ v0
since η/(ρ + η) < 1.T h u sw em u s th a v ev1 − ζ>v 0, which implies that a∗
−1 =1 .I m p o s i n ga∗
−1 =1 ,
the value function of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm can be written as:
ρv0 =m a x
x0
{−ω∗G(x0)+x0 [v1 − v0]+x∗
0 [v−1 − v0]}, (43)
≥ max
x0
{−ω∗G(x0)+x0 [v1 − v0]},
≥ max
x0














−1 [v1 − v−1 − ζ]+η[v0 − v−1],
= ρv−1,
which contradicts the hypothesis that v−1 >v 0 and establishes the claim.


















+ η[v0 − vn] (44)
















+ η[v0 − vn+1]. (45)















+ η[v0 − vn]












+ η[v0 − vn+1].
Since λ
−n−1 <λ
−n, this implies vn <v n+1, contradicting the hypothesis that vn ≥ vn+1,a n de s -
tablishing the desired result, vn <v n+1.C o n s e q u e n t l y , {vn}
∞
n=−1 is nondecreasing and {vn}
∞
n=0 is
(strictly) increasing. Since a nondecreasing sequence in a compact set must converge, {vn}
∞
n=−1 con-
verges to its limit point, v∞, which must be strictly positive, since {vn}
∞
n=0 is strictly increasing and
has a nonnegative initial value. This completes the proof.




ω∗ and xn ≥ 0,
with complementary slackness. G0 (0) is strictly positive by assumption. If (vn+1 − vn)/ω∗ <G 0 (0),
then xn =0 . Proposition 2 implies that {vn}
∞
n=−1 is a convergent and thus a Cauchy sequence, which
implies that there exists ∃n∗ ∈ N such that vn+1 − vn <ω ∗G0 (0) for all n ≥ n∗.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . From equation (29),
δn+1 ≡ vn+1 − vn <v n − vn−1 ≡ δn (46)

























where ¯ ρ ≡ ρ + x∗
−1 + η.S i n c ex∗
n+1, x∗
n and x∗
n−1 are maximizers of the value functions vn+1, vn and
vn−1, (47) implies:













































































Now taking diﬀerences with ¯ ρvn and using the deﬁnitions of δn’s, we obtain





n+1 (δn+2 − δn+1)





n−1 (δn+1 − δn).
Therefore, ¡
¯ ρ + x∗
n−1
¢
(δn+1 − δn) ≤− kn + x∗
n+1 (δn+2 − δn+1), (49)
where
kn ≡ (λ − 1)
2 λ
−n−1 > 0.
36Now to obtain a contradiction, suppose that δn+1 − δn ≥ 0. From (49), this implies δn+2 − δn+1 > 0
since kn is strictly positive. Repeating this argument successively, we have that if δn0+1 − δn0 ≥ 0,
then δn+1 − δn > 0 for all n ≥ n0. However, we know from Proposition 2 that {vn}
∞
n=0 is strictly
increasing and converges to a constant v∞. This implies that δn ↓ 0, which contradicts the hypothesis
that δn+1 − δn ≥ 0 for all n ≥ n0 ≥ 0, and establishes that x∗
n+1 ≤ x∗
n. To see that the inequality is
strict when x∗
n > 0,i ts u ﬃces to note that we have already established (46), i.e., δn+1 −δn < 0,t h u si f
equation (29) has a positive solution, then we necessarily have x∗
n+1 <x ∗
n.
Proof of Proposition 5. Proof of x∗
0 ≥ x∗
−1 : Suppose ﬁrst that ζ>v 1 − v0. Then (28) implies
a∗
−1 =0 , and (26) can be written as
ρv0 = −ω∗G(x∗
0)+x∗
0 [v−1 + v1 − 2v0]. (50)
We have v0 ≥ 0 from Proposition 2. Suppose v0 > 0. Then (50) implies x∗
0 > 0 and
v−1 + v1 − 2v0 > 0 (51)
v1 − v0 >v 0 − v−1.
This inequality combined with a∗
−1 =0 , (31) and (38) yields x∗
0 >x ∗
−1. Suppose next that v0 =0 .
Inequality (51) now holds as a weak inequality and implies that x∗
0 ≥ x∗
−1.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e G(·) is
strictly convex and x∗
0 is given by (31), (50) then implies x∗
0 =0and thus x∗
−1 =0 .
We next show that when ζ ≤ v1 − v0, x∗
0 ≥ x∗
−1.I nt h i sc a s e ,a∗
−1 =1is an optimal policy, so that
ρv0 = −ω∗G(x∗
0)+x∗
0 [v1 − v0]+x∗
0 [v−1 − v0]
ρv−1 ≥− ω∗G(x∗
0)+x∗
0 [v1 − v−1 − ζ]+η[v0 − v−1].
Subtracting the second expression from the ﬁrst, we obtain
ρ[v0 − v−1] ≤ x∗
0 [v−1 + ζ − v0]+( x∗
0 + η)[v−1 − v0],
and therefore
[v0 − v−1] ≤ [v−1 + ζ − v0].
Proposition 2 implies that v−1 ≤ v0, and therefore v−1 + ζ ≥ v0. Next observe that with a∗
−1 =1 ,
(31) and (38) imply that x∗
0 ≥ x∗
−1 if and only if v1 − v0 ≥ v1 − v−1 − ζ, or equivalently if and only if
v−1 + ζ ≥ v0. Thus we have established that x∗
0 ≥ x∗
−1 both when ζ>v 1 − v0 and when ζ ≤ v1 − v0.
L e m m a1a n dp r o o f :We next ﬁrst prove a lemma, which will be used in the rest of the Appendix.





> 0,t h e nx∗
0 > 0 and v0 > 0.
Proof of Lemma: Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that x∗
0 =0 .T h e ﬁrst part of the proof
then implies that x∗
−1 =0 . Then (25) implies
ρv1 ≥ 1 − λ + η [v0 − v1].
Equation (26) together with x∗
0 =0gives v0 =0 , and hence



































> 0 then implies x∗
0 > 0, thus leading to a contradiction and establishing
that x∗
0 > 0. Strict convexity of G(·) together with x∗
0 > 0 then implies v0 > 0.¥
Proof of x∗
0 >x ∗











> 0 implies that x∗
0 > 0.T h e n t h e ﬁrst part of the proof implies that
when ζ>v 1 − v0, x∗
0 >x ∗
−1.N e x ts u p p o s et h a t0 <ζ<v 1 − v0. Then the same argument as above
implies that x∗
0 >x ∗
−1 if and only if v1 − v0 >v 1 − v−1 − ζ, or equivalently if and only if v−1 + ζ>v 0.
Suppose this is not the case. Then from the ﬁrst part of the proof, we have that x∗
0 = x∗
−1 =0 ,a n d
thus v−1 = v0 =0 , which implies v−1 + ζ>v 0 and thus x∗
0 >x ∗
−1. This yields a contradiction and
completes the proof that x∗
0 >x ∗








1 : To prove that x∗
0 >x ∗
1, let us write the value functions v2,v 1 and v0 as in (48)
in the proof of Proposition 4:
¯ ρv2 =1 − λ
−2 − ω∗G(x∗
2)+x∗












¯ ρv1 ≥ 1 − λ
−1 − ω∗G(x∗
2)+x∗












¯ ρv1 ≥ 1 − λ
−1 − ω∗G(x∗
0)+x∗












¯ ρv0 = −ω∗G(x0)+x∗
0 [v1 − v0]+ηv0 + x∗
−1v0 + x∗
0 [v−1 − v0].
Now taking diﬀerences with ¯ ρvn and using the deﬁnitions of δn’s as in (46) in the proof of Proposition
4, we obtain




















































Next note that Proposition 2 implies that v−1 − v0 ≤ 0.M o r e o v e r , t h e ﬁr s tp a r to ft h eﬁrst part
of the proof has established that x∗
−1 − x∗
0 ≤ 0. Combining this with a∗










0 (δ2 − δ1).
Now combining this inequality with the ﬁrst inequality of (52), we obtain
(¯ ρ + x∗





2 (δ3 − δ2). (53)
Proposition 2 has established δ2 >δ 3, so that the right-hand side is strictly negative, therefore, we
must have δ2 − δ1 < 0, which implies that x∗
0 >x ∗
1 and completes the proof.








, and consider the optimization







− ˜ ωG(xn)+xn [vn+1 − vn]
+˜ x−1 (˜ a−1 [v−1 − vn + ζ]+( 1− ˜ a−1)[v0 − vn]) + η[v0 − vn]} for n ∈ N
ρv0 =m a x
x0∈[0,¯ x]
{−˜ ωG(x0)+x0 [v1 − v0]+˜ x0 [v−1 − v0]}
ρv−1 =m a x
x−1∈[0,¯ x],a −1∈[0,1]
{−˜ ωG(x0)+x−1 (a−1 [v1 − v−1 − ζ]+( 1− a−1)[v0 − v−1])
+η[v0 − v−1]}.
38We now transform this dynamic optimization problem into a form that can be represented as a
contraction mapping using the method of “uniformization” (see, for example, Ross, 1996, Chapter










ξ | ˜ ξ
´
be the probability that the next state will








and the R&D policy of other ﬁr m si sg i v e nb y˜ ξ. Using the fact that, because of uniform IPR
policy, hx−n,a −ni = hx−1,a −1i for all n ∈ N, these transition probabilities can be written as:
p−1,0
³









































Uniformization involves adding ﬁctitious transitions from a state into itself, which do not change the
value of the program, but allow us to represent the optimization problem as a contraction. For this
purpose, deﬁne the transition rates ψn as
ψn
³






xn + x−1 + η for n ∈ {1,2,...}
x−1 + η for n = −1
2xn for n =0
.
These transition rates are ﬁnite since ψn
³
ξ | ˜ ξ
´
≤ ψ ≡ 2¯ x + η<∞ for all n,w h e r e¯ x is the maximal
ﬂow rate of innovation deﬁn e di n( 1 1 )i nt h et e x t( b o t h¯ x and η are ﬁnite by assumption).
Now following equation (5.8.3) in Ross (1996), we can use these transition rates and deﬁne the new
transition probabilities (including the ﬁctitious transitions from a state to itself) as:
˜ pn,n0
³









ξ | ˜ ξ
´
if n 6= n0
1 −
ψn(ξ|˜ ξ)
ψ if n = n0
.
This yields equivalent transition probabilities
˜ p−1,−1
³




2¯ x+η ˜ p−1,0
³




2¯ x+η ˜ p−1,1
³







ξ | ˜ ξ
´
= ˜ x0
2¯ x+η ˜ p0,0
³
ξ | ˜ ξ
´
=1− x0+˜ x0
2¯ x+η ˜ p0,1
³










2¯ x+η ˜ pn,n
³




2¯ x+η ˜ pn,n+1
³
ξ | ˜ ξ
´
= xn
2¯ x+η ˜ pn,−1
³











2¯ x + η
ρ +2¯ x + η
.








Using these transformations, the dynamic optimization problem can be written as:












, for all n ∈ Z, (55)
≡ T˜ vn, for all n ∈ Z.
39where v ≡{vn}
∞
n=−1 and the second line deﬁnes the operator T, mapping from the space of
functions V ≡{v :{−1} ∪ Z+ → R+} into itself. T is clearly a contraction, thus, for given
z =
­




, possesses a unique ﬁxed point v∗ ≡ {v∗
n}
∞
n=−1 (e.g., Stokey, Lucas and Prescott,
1989).
Moreover, xn ∈ [0, ¯ x], a−1 ∈ [0,1],a n dvn for each n = −1,0,1,... given by the right-hand side of
(55) is continuous in an and xn (an applying only for n = −1), so Berge’s Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis









is nonempty and compact-valued for each z and is upper hemi-continuous in z =
­














convex-valued for each z, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. We ﬁrst show that the mapping Φ: Z ⇒ Z constructed in (40) has a





> 0 this ﬁxed point corresponds
to a steady state with ω∗ < 1.
First, it has already been established that Φ maps Z into itself. We next show that Z is compact
in the product topology and is a subset of a locally convex Hausdorﬀ space. The ﬁr s tp a r tf o l l o w s
from the fact that Z can be written as the Cartesian product of compact subsets, Z =[0,1] × [0,1]× Q∞
n=−1 [0, ¯ x]. Then by Tychonoﬀ’s Theorem (e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 2.57, p. 52;
Kelley, 1955, p. 143), Z is compact in the product topology. Moreover, Z is clearly nonempty and also
convex, since for any z,z0 ∈ Z and λ ∈ [0,1],w eh a v eλz+(1− λ)z0 ∈ Z. Finally, since Z is a product
of intervals on the real line, it is a subset of a locally convex Hausdorﬀ space (see Aliprantis and Border,
1999, Lemma 5.54, p. 192).
Next, ϕ is a continuous function from Z into [0,1] and from Proposition 6, A−1 (z) and Xn (z) for
n ∈ {−1} ∪ Z+ are upper hemi-continuous in z.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,Φ ≡ hϕ[z],A −1 [z], X[z]i has closed
graph in z in the product topology. Moreover, each one of ϕ(z), A−1 (z) and Xn (z) for n = −1,0,... is
nonempty, compact and convex-valued. Therefore, the image of the mapping Φ is nonempty, compact
and convex-valued for each z ∈ Z. The Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem implies that if
the function Φ maps a convex, compact and nonempty subset of a locally convex Hausdorﬀ space into
itself and has closed graph and is nonempty, compact and convex-valued z, then it possesses a ﬁxed
point z∗ ∈ Φ(z∗) (see Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 16.50 and Corollary 16.51, pp. 549-550).
This establishes the existence of a ﬁxed point z∗ of Φ.
To complete the proof, we need to show that the ﬁxed point, z∗, corresponds to a steady state


















n for n ∈








constitutes an R&D policy vector
that is best response to itself, as required by steady-state equilibrium (Deﬁnition 3). Next, we need to
prove that the implied labor share ω∗ leads to labor market clearing. This follows from the fact that the
ﬁxed point involves ω∗ < 1, since in this case (39) will have an interior solution, ensuring labor market
clearing. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that ω∗ =1 . Then, as noted in the text, we must have
µ∗
0 =1 . From (32), (33) and (34), this implies x∗
n =0for n ∈ {−1} ∪ Z+. However, Lemma 1 implies





> 0. Consequently, (39) cannot be satisﬁed
at ω∗ =1 , implying that ω∗ < 1.W h e nω∗ < 1, the labor market clearing condition (35) is satisﬁed
at ω∗ as an equality, so ω∗ is an equilibrium given {x∗
n}
∞









steady-state equilibrium as desired.
Finally, if η>0, then (34) implies that µ∗
0 > 0.S i n c ex∗
0 > 0 from Lemma 1, equation (36) implies
g∗ > 0.A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,i fx∗
−1 > 0,t h e ng∗ > 0 follows from (36), completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8. We will establish that there exists n∗ such that x∗
n∗ =0 and x∗
n > 0 for




forms a ﬁnite and irreducible Markov chain over the states n =0 ,1,...,n∗.
First, recall that Proposition 2 has established that {vn}n∈Z+ is strictly increasing. Then it follows
from the proof of Proposition 3 that there exists a state n∗∗ ∈ N such that x∗∗
n =0for all n ≥
40n∗∗.N o w l e t n∗ =m i n n∈{0,...,n∗∗} {n ∈ N:vn+1 − vn ≤ ω∗G0 (0)}. Such an n∗ exists, since the set






Then by construction x∗
n > 0 for all n<n ∗ and x∗
n∗ =0as desired. Now denoting the probability of
being in state ˜ n starting in state n after τ periods by Pτ (n, ˜ n),w eh a v et h a tlimτ→∞ Pτ (n, ˜ n)=0for












n=0 is uniquely deﬁned. Moreover, the underlying Markov chain is irreducible (since x∗
n > 0 for
n =0 ,1,...,n∗ − 1, so that all states communicate with n =0or n =1 ). Therefore, by Theorem 11.2




Proof of Proposition 9. There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that {vn}n∈Z+ is
strictly increasing. Then it follows from the proof of Proposition 3 that there exists a state n∗ ∈ N
such that x∗
n =0for all n ≥ n∗, and as in the proof of Proposition 8, states n ≥ n∗ are transient (i.e.,
limτ→∞ Pτ (n, ˜ n)=0for all ˜ n>n ∗ and for all n), so µ∗
n =0for all n ≥ n∗.
Second, in contrast to the ﬁrst case, suppose that there exists some n∗∗ ∈ Z+ such that vn∗∗ ≥
vn∗∗+1. Then, let n∗ =m i n n∈{0,...,n∗∗} {n ∈ N:vn+1 − vn ≤ ω∗G0 (0)}, which is again well deﬁned.
Then, optimal R&D decision (29) immediately implies that x∗
n > 0 for all states with n<n ∗,a n d
since x∗
n∗ =0 ,a l ls t a t e sn>n ∗ are transient and limτ→∞ Pτ (n, ˜ n)=0for all ˜ n>n ∗ and for all n,
completing the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0 . The proof follows closely that of Proposition 6. In particular, again
using uniformization, the maximization problem of an individual ﬁrm can be written as a contraction
mapping similar to (55) there. The ﬁniteness of the transition probabilities follows, since ψn
³
ξ | ˜ ξ
´
≤
ψ ≡ 2¯ x +m a x n {ηn} < ∞ (this is a consequence of the fact that ¯ x deﬁned in (11) is ﬁnite and
maxn {ηn} is ﬁnite, since each ηn ∈ R+ and by assumption, there exists ¯ n<∞ such that ηn = η¯ n).
This contraction mapping uniquely determines the value function v[z]:Z → R+.
Berge’s Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 16.31, p. 539) again implies
that each of An (z) for n ∈ Z−\{0} and Xn (z) for n ∈ Z is upper hemi-continuous in z =h˜ ω,˜ a,˜ xi,





n=−∞, are nonempty, compact and convex-valued.













n=−∞ [0, ¯ x]. Again by Ty-
chonoﬀ’s Theorem, Z is compact in the product topology. Then consider the mapping Φ: Z ⇒ Z
constructed as Φ ≡ (ϕ,A,X),w h e r eϕ is given by (39) and A and X are deﬁned in Proposition 10.
Clearly Φ maps Z into itself. Moreover, as in the proof of Proposition 7, Z is nonempty, convex, and
a subset of a locally convex Hausdorﬀ space. The proof of Proposition 10 then implies that Φ has
closed graph in the product topology and is nonempty, compact and convex-valued in z.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem again applies and implies that Φ has a ﬁxed point
z∗ ∈ Φ(z∗). The argument that the ﬁxed point z∗ corresponds to a steady-state equilibrium is identical






> 0 implies that x∗
0 > 0.T h er e s u l tt h a tω∗ < 1 then follows immediately.
Finally, as in the proof of Proposition 7, either η1 > 0 or x∗
−1 > 0 is suﬃcient for g∗ > 0.
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λ 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
γ 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
η1 0 0 0 0.054 0
η2 0 0 0 0.005 0
η3 0 0 0 0 0
η4 0 0 0 0 0
η5 0 0 0 0 0
ζ1 ∞ 3.52 0 ∞ 0
ζ2 ∞ 3.52 0 ∞ 0.82
ζ3 ∞ 3.52 0 ∞ 1.94
ζ4 ∞ 3.52 0 ∞ 1.95
ζ5 ∞ 3.52 0 ∞ 1.95
v1 − v0 2.70 3.52 1.71 1.59 1.96
x∗
−1 0.018 0.021 0.023 0.010 0.026
x∗
0 0.029 0.033 0.023 0.022 0.024
µ∗
0 0.238 0 0 0.440 0
µ∗
1 0.326 0.481 0.506 0.195 0.446
µ∗
2 0.189 0.253 0.253 0.135 0.232
ω∗ 0.952 0.931 0.936 0.961 0.937
Researcher
ratio
0.032 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.039
g∗ 0.0186 0.0258 0.0263 0.0203 0.0296
Note: This table gives the results of the benchmark numerical computations with ρ =0 .05, λ =1 .05,
γ =0 .35 under ﬁve diﬀerent IPR policy regimes. It reports the steady-state equilibrium values of
the diﬀerence in the values v1 − v0; the R&D rate of a follower that is one step behind, x∗
−1;t h e
R&D rate of neck-and-neck competitors, x∗
0; fraction of industries in neck-and-neck competition, µ∗
0;
fraction of industries at a technology gap of n =1 ; the value of “labor share,” ω∗; the ratio of the labor
force working in research; and the growth rate, g∗. It also reports the growth-maximizing uniform and
state-dependent IPR policies with or without licensing. See text for details.
























λ 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
γ 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
η1 0 0 0 0.272 0
η2 0 0 0 0.017 0
η3 0 0 0 0 0
η4 0 0 0 0 0
η5 0 0 0 0 0
ζ1 ∞ 0.19 0 ∞ 0
ζ2 ∞ 0.19 0 ∞ 0.04
ζ3 ∞ 0.19 0 ∞ 0.10
ζ4 ∞ 0.19 0 ∞ 0.10
ζ5 ∞ 0.19 0 ∞ 0.10
v1 − v0 0.14 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.10
x∗
−1 0.090 0.106 0.107 0.053 0.126
x∗
0 0.139 0.162 0.107 0.103 0.115
µ∗
0 0.245 0 0 0.452 0
µ∗
1 0.330 0.496 0.501 0.191 0.455
µ∗
2 0.186 0.251 0.251 0.137 0.232
ω∗ 0.991 0.987 0.987 0.993 0.988
Researcher
ratio
0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.010
g∗ 0.0186 0.0257 0.0257 0.0203 0.0293
Note: This table gives the results of the benchmark numerical computations with ρ =0 .05, λ =1 .01,
γ =0 .35 under ﬁve diﬀerent IPR policy regimes. It reports the steady-state equilibrium values of
the diﬀerence in the values v1 − v0; the R&D rate of a follower that is one step behind, x∗
−1;t h e
R&D rate of neck-and-neck competitors, x∗
0; fraction of industries in neck-and-neck competition, µ∗
0;
fraction of industries at a technology gap of n =1 ; the value of “labor share,” ω∗; the ratio of the labor
force working in research; and the growth rate, g∗. It also reports the growth-maximizing uniform and
state-dependent IPR policies with or without licensing. See text for details.
























λ 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
γ 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
η1 0 0 0 0.014 0
η2 0 0 0 0.002 0
η3 0 0 0 0.001 0
η4 0 0 0 0 0
η5 0 0 0 0 0
ζ1 ∞ 24.85 0 ∞ 0
ζ2 ∞ 24.85 0 ∞ 5.69
ζ3 ∞ 24.85 0 ∞ 12.25
ζ4 ∞ 24.85 0 ∞ 14.75
ζ5 ∞ 24.85 0 ∞ 14.98
v1 − v0 20.11 24.85 13.69 12.40 14.99
x∗
−1 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.008
x∗
0 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.007
µ∗
0 0.221 0 0 0.418 0
µ∗
1 0.318 0.452 0.523 0.206 0.445
µ∗
2 0.199 0.260 0.261 0.142 0.236
ω∗ 0.806 0.743 0.783 0.847 0.760
Researcher
ratio
0.068 0.056 0.070 0.058 0.090
g∗ 0.0186 0.0261 0.0284 0.0200 0.0306
Note: This table gives the results of the benchmark numerical computations with ρ =0 .05, λ =1 .2,
γ =0 .35 under ﬁve diﬀerent IPR policy regimes. It reports the steady-state equilibrium values of
the diﬀerence in the values v1 − v0; the R&D rate of a follower that is one step behind, x∗
−1;t h e
R&D rate of neck-and-neck competitors, x∗
0; fraction of industries in neck-and-neck competition, µ∗
0;
fraction of industries at a technology gap of n =1 ; the value of “labor share,” ω∗; the ratio of the labor
force working in research; and the growth rate, g∗. It also reports the growth-maximizing uniform and
state-dependent IPR policies with or without licensing. See text for details.
























λ 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
γ 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
η1 0 0 0 0.291 0
η2 0 0 0 0 0
η3 0 0 0 0 0
η4 0 0 0 0 0
η5 0 0 0 0 0
ζ1 ∞ 3.11 0 ∞ 0
ζ2 ∞ 3.11 0 ∞ 0.77
ζ3 ∞ 3.11 0 ∞ 1.90
ζ4 ∞ 3.11 0 ∞ 1.90
ζ5 ∞ 3.11 0 ∞ 1.90
v1 − v0 2.20 3.11 1.64 0.48 1.90
x∗
−1 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.016 0.025
x∗
0 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.021 0.024
µ∗
0 0.314 0 0 0.777 0
µ∗
1 0.333 0.497 0.501 0.096 0.492
µ∗
2 0.172 0.251 0.251 0.058 0.248
ω∗ 0.944 0.916 0.917 0.981 0.917
Researcher
ratio
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.010
g∗ 0.0186 0.0278 0.0280 0.0220 0.0286
Note: This table gives the results of the benchmark numerical computations with ρ =0 .05, λ =1 .05,
γ =0 .1 under ﬁve diﬀerent IPR policy regimes. It reports the steady-state equilibrium values of the
diﬀerence in the values v1 − v0; the R&D rate of a follower that is one step behind, x∗
−1;t h eR & D
rate of neck-and-neck competitors, x∗
0; fraction of industries in neck-and-neck competition, µ∗
0;f r a c t i o n
of industries at a technology gap of n =1 ; the value of “labor share,” ω∗; the ratio of the labor
force working in research; and the growth rate, g∗. It also reports the growth-maximizing uniform and
state-dependent IPR policies with or without licensing. See text for details..
























λ 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
γ 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
η1 0 0 0 0.070 0.007
η2 0 0 0 0.019 0
η3 0 0 0 0.007 0
η4 0 0 0 0.003 0
η5 0 0 0 0 0
ζ1 ∞ 5.24 5.24 ∞ 0
ζ2 ∞ 5.24 5.24 ∞ 0.59
ζ3 ∞ 5.24 5.24 ∞ 1.69
ζ4 ∞ 5.24 5.24 ∞ 2.13
ζ5 ∞ 5.24 5.24 ∞ 2.35
v1 − v0 4.38 5.24 5.24 2.25 2.35
x∗
−1 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.002 0.027
x∗
0 0.053 0.070 0.070 0.020 0.021
µ∗
0 0.092 0 0 0.327 0.037
µ∗
1 0.257 0.413 0.413 0.094 0.242
µ∗
2 0.193 0.252 0.252 0.074 0.128
ω∗ 0.942 0.937 0.937 0.9320 0.9307
Researcher
ratio
0.073 0.044 0.044 0.087 0.010
g∗ 0.0186 0.0198 0.0198 0.0230 0.0303
Note: This table gives the results of the benchmark numerical computations with ρ =0 .05, λ =1 .05,
γ =0 .6 under ﬁve diﬀerent IPR policy regimes. It reports the steady-state equilibrium values of the
diﬀerence in the values v1 − v0; the R&D rate of a follower that is one step behind, x∗
−1;t h eR & D
rate of neck-and-neck competitors, x∗
0; fraction of industries in neck-and-neck competition, µ∗
0;f r a c t i o n
of industries at a technology gap of n =1 ; the value of “labor share,” ω∗; the ratio of the labor
force working in research; and the growth rate, g∗. It also reports the growth-maximizing uniform and
state-dependent IPR policies with or without licensing. See text for details.
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Figure 1. Value Functions.
.
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Figure 2. R&D Efforts.
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Figure 3. Industry Shares.









Figure 4. Value Functions.











Figure 5. R&D Efforts.










Figure 6. Industry Shares.
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